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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970's, there has been considerable judicial and aca-
demic analysis of the types of personal interests that trigger application of
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. For
example, the Supreme Court's well-documented shift from a broad
"injury"-based conception of liberty and property' to a more technical
definition of those terms2 has sparked intense debate among legal schol-
ars.' Yet, notwithstanding the voluminous scholarship dedicated to defin-
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1. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (termination of financial aid pending
resolution of controversy "may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live"). But
see Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) ("[T]o require work on the public roads has never been
regarded as a deprivation of either liberty or property.").
2. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). For a general
discussion of the Court's transformation of these terms from broad to technical principles, see
Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977).
3. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85; Laycock, Due
Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort to Make the Due Process Clauses Nonjusticiable, 60
TEx. L. REv. 875 (1982); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory,
61 B.U.L. REv. 885 (1981); Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Pro-
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ing the interests triggering due process, little attention has been given a
question of far greater importance to the typical litigant who invokes the
clause: What process is due once it is recognized that the guarantee ap-
plies in a given case?4
One might expect that the Court which developed a precise and techni-
cal definition of one variable of the due process equation would also have
made some progress toward establishing broad guidelines for treating the
question of how much process is due. Yet this is far from the case. The
Supreme Court has continued to adhere to its long-standing position that
the content of due process is extremely flexible, and not susceptible to
precise definition.
5
In this Article we will consider the question of what procedures are
necessary to meet the due process requirement. First, we will critique the
positivist argument that the legislative determination of how much process
is due should satisfy the constitutional requirement." This conception of
due process, we argue, effectively renders the guarantee a rubber stamp
for all legislative enactments. Further, the historical evidence upon which
the positivists rely offers no real support for any particular conception of
the clause, even if one accepts the controversial principle that modern con-
stitutional interpretation is rigidly controlled by the intent of the framers.7
We will then examine the flexible approach that the Court has adopted
in dealing with most due process claims.8 After tracing the evolution of
the flexible model, we find that the conception of due process as an inher-
ently abstract notion which must be applied on a case-by-case basis is not
entirely consistent with the purposes of the clause. Although a certain de-
gree of situational flexibility is both necessary and advisable, it should
come into play only after the establishment of a solid, value-oriented floor
serving as the necessary "ground" for procedural due process. Absent such
a floor, the flexibility of due process threatens to make the guarantee de-
pendent on legislative choice, the same result as that achieved by the posi-
tivist approach.
We will then explore the contours of the due process "floor." An analy-
cess, DUE PROCESS: NoMos XVIII 126 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Saphire, SpecJ'ing
Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 111 (1978); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269 (1975).
4. Some of the notable writings on this issue include: Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975); Note, Specifjing the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits
on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1510 (1975).
5. "'[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands."' Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 200 (1982) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972)).
6. See infra notes 12-56 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 19-36 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 57-86 and accompanying text.
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Vol. 95: 455, 1986
Adjudicatory Independence
sis of the proper constitutional values informing the procedural due pro-
cess requirement demonstrates that the participation of an independent
adjudicator is at least one element of this floor.9 Regardless of what other
procedural safeguards are employed, the values of due process cannot be
realized absent this core element. Thus, the participation of an indepen-
dent adjudicator is at least a necessary condition, and may even constitute
a sufficient condition, for satisfying the requirements of due process.
Such an assertion may seem so basic as to be totally free from contro-
versy. However, neither court nor commentator has paid sufficient atten-
tion to the primacy of adjudicatory independence in the due process infra-
structure. In fact, the need for adjudicatory independence grows as the
modern realist skepticism about the possibility of truly neutral principles
of adjudication increases. In the absence of such principles, the role of the
adjudicator in assuring fairness to the litigants becomes critical. Because
of the special importance of the participation of an independent adjudica-
tor and the difficulties inherent in assuring that independence on a case-
by-case basis, the independence of the adjudicator must be protected
through formalized, prophylactic protections.10 Only those potentials for
bias that cannot be eradicated without incurring severe institutional costs
should be tolerated. Finally, we will apply this model to several fact situa-
tions to which the due process requirement applies, 1 an exercise that will
illustrate the illusory nature of the due process guarantee absent the par-
ticipation of an independent adjudicator.
II. THE FALLACY OF THE POSITIVIST ANALYSIS: PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS AS LEGISLATIVE COMMAND
A. The Positivists' View of Procedural Due Process as Legislative
Command
According to the positivist view of procedural due process, the courts
should play no role in defining what procedures are necessary to satisfy
the constitutional requirement.12 Rather, the term "due process" dictates
that individuals be afforded whatever procedures the legislature has man-
dated-no more and no less. If the legislature has not recognized the right
9. See infra notes 87-143 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 150-80 and accompanying text.
12. See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 94-109 (basing conclusion that courts have no role in defin-
ing due process on structure of Constitution, antecedents of due process clause, and Court's early due
process cases).
It is important to note that the issue at stake here is not merely the appropriate level of judicial
review. Under the positivist approach there is absolutely nothing for the courts to review, because the
legislature is afforded unfettered discretion.
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to a given procedure, the positivist argument goes, it is simply not "due"
in any sense of the word.
This argument is not a new one. Indeed, in the first Supreme Court
decision construing the clause,1" the Court considered and rejected this
proposition:
It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact
any process which might be devised. The article is a restraint on the
legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the gov-
ernment, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to
make any process 'due process of law,' by its mere will.
14
Notwithstanding the Court's early words, this position has frequently
been advanced in recent years. 15 Its supporters have based their arguments
on some combination of the following approaches. First, they argue that
the framers of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments understood the
words "due process" to mandate no more than compliance with the law of
the land as established by the legislative branch, or at most to require
mere technical service of process.1 ' Second, they argue that, from a struc-
tural standpoint, it is unreasonable to impute to the framers an intention
to grant broad and boundless authority to the judiciary.
17 Finally, from a
functional standpoint, they argue that there is no principled way for the
courts to allow the legislature to define substantive entitlements but not
allow that same body to define the procedures required to terminate those
entitlements.18 Yet none of these arguments, as we shall see, supports the
positivist approach.
13. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
14. Id. at 276.
15. The strongest supporter of this position on the current bench is Justice Rehnquist. See, e.g.,
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1503 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(Court "ought to recognize the totality of the State's definition of the property right"); Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (writing for three justice plurality) ("[P]roperty interest which appel-
lee had in his government was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations which had encompassed
the grant of that interest."). In academic circles, Raoul Berger has been one of the chief advocates of
this position, at least as it relates to the Fourteenth Amendment. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT By
JUDICIARY 193-214 (1977).
16. See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 95-100 and discussion infra at notes 19-36 and accompany-
ing text.
17. See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 94-95 and discussion infra at notes 37-45 and accompany-
ing text.
18. See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 109-15 and discussion infra at notes 46-56 and accompany-
ing text.
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B. The Historical Rationale
The positivists19 typically seek to find support for their approach in the
framers' choice of the words "due process." In his recent article, for exam-
ple, Professor (now Judge) Easterbrook sets out three alternative interpre-
tations of the phrase "due process of law."20 First, the phrase might have
been interpreted to mean only that before an individual is deprived of life,
liberty, or property, he must physically be served with actual legal process
by the sheriff or otherwise.2' Second, the phrase might have been under-
stood to require "courts to comply with procedures laid down in law," but
not to authorize "judicial revision of law."22 Finally, the clause could have
been understood by the framers as a "general grant of power to courts to
ensure that all procedures are 'due' or fair." It is unclear, Easterbrook
argues, whether the first or the second definition encompasses the framers'
understanding of the scope of the clause. But he is able to conclude that
they did not mean to vest the judiciary with broad authority to assure
procedural fairness-no matter how "natural" that reading seems to those
"steeped in the decisions of the last twenty years."'23
Initially, one may question whether the intent of the framers in drafting
a constitutional provision should control modern construction, at least
when the constitutional language rationally lends itself to a broader inter-
pretation. Easterbrook's analysis begins with the explicit assumption that
a strict historical construction should control. This view is hardly univer-
sally accepted as a canon of constitutional interpretation.24 If one con-
cludes that historical analysis is, as a practical or conceptual matter, of
only limited value in construing the Constitution, then Easterbrook's
painstaking examination of the framers' understanding becomes largely
irrelevant.
One need not even reach this broad issue of constitutional construction,
however, to see the frailty of the positivist interpretation of procedural due
process. For even under a purely historical analysis, the positivists fail to
establish that the framers intended so narrow and technical a construction
of the clause.
19. For a discussion of the use of the term "positivism" in the "due process" context, as compared
with the legal philosophy of positivism, see Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72
CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1071 n.141 (1984).
20. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 90.
21. Raoul Berger has also argued that the clause "was conceived in utterly procedural terms,
specifically, that a defendant must be afforded an opportunity to answer by service of process in
proper form, that is, in due course." R. BERGER, supra note 15, at 197.
22. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 90.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 9-36 (1982);
Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 456-74 (1984); Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980).
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First, the possibility that the clause refers to mere technical service of
process conflicts with what we know about the way the framers under-
stood due process. For many years prior to the adoption of the Fifth
Amendment, the phrase had been interpreted to include a wide array of
procedural protections, and it is thus inconceivable that the framers would
have used the phrase in its narrowest sense.
2 5 It is well established that
the phrase "due process" of law was based on the Magna Carta's "law of
the land" provision. 26 The dispute between Lords Coke and Blackstone
over the definition of that term concerned only whether it gave the com-
mon law supremacy over Parliament in establishing fair procedures.
Neither Coke nor Blackstone, however, understood the term to refer solely
to service of process.
Even if the term cannot be construed to refer to service of process, how-
ever, Easterbrook offers another interpretation that similarly questions the
traditional definition of due process. Easterbrook argues that the differ-
ence in interpretation between the view that affords the judiciary the
power to set procedure and the view that renders the legislature's actions
the equivalent of due process derives from a dispute between Lord Coke
and Blackstone. It was Lord Coke's position that the term "per legem
terrae," the Magna Carta's equivalent of due process, included compo-
nents of natural law and was therefore capable of overriding parliamen-
tary action.27 Blackstone, on the other hand, never explicitly defined the
25. Rodney Mott concludes that:
It is evident that the colonists looked upon due process of law as a guarantee which had a
wide, varied, and indefinite content. At no time was there any serious attempt to define it, and
it is noteworthy that they should seize upon these particular words under such diverse circum-
stances. It is not probable that any of the colonists realized how much was wrapped up in the
thirty-ninth section of the Great Charter, but it is certain that many of them realized that it
had a much wider import than merely guaranteeing proper procedure in criminal cases.
R. MORT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 123 (1926).
26. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521-25 (1884); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276-78 (1855).
27. See II COKE, INsTrrtrrEs 50 (4th ed. 1671). To Lord Coke, the restraints imposed on Parlia-
ment's authority were all derived from "natural law." In Dr. Bonham's Case, for example, he ex-
plained that "it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul Acts of
Parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against
common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul
it, and adjudge such Act to be void. ... 8 Co. 114a, lSa (c.p. 1610).
Easterbrook claims that "Coke was a solitary voice in English law. His natural law utterances were
uninfluential with other English judges and other commentators." Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 96. It
is not clear whether Easterbrook means that Coke was a solitary voice with regard to his whole
conception of natural law or, alternatively, only with regard to his interpretation of the "law of the
land" provision of the Magna Carta. In either case, Easterbrook is incorrect: There was considerable
support for both of Coke's positions.
Rodney Mott, after surveying the rise and decline of Coke's view regarding the supremacy of the
Magna Carta, explains that there is "no doubt that up to the last quarter of the Eighteenth Century,
English opinion was by no means unanimously behind the officially growing doctrine of Parliamen-
tary supremacy." R. Moi-r, supra note 25, at 66. Indeed, he points out, "[t]he influence of Coke may
be found in the attitude of the English courts at the present time as well as in the writings of political
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term "law of the land," leading Easterbrook to conclude that he implicitly
rejected Coke's broad conception.28 In any event, Easterbrook is correct in
pointing out that it is irrelevant which of these scholars properly inter-
preted the Magna Carta. Arguably, it is important, however, to consider
to what extent the framers of the Bill of Rights were familiar with either
or both of these views.
Even if Blackstone's view correctly concluded that the Magna Carta's
"law of the land" provision did not override parliamentary action, this
would not be dispositive of the relationship of the due process clause to
legislative action within our constitutional system. The English system
was, on the whole, one in which "the omnipotence of Parliament over the
common law was absolute, even against common right and reason."2 9 But
the framers of the Constitution and of the Bill of Rights explicitly rejected
this theory of government. The Constitution, unlike the Magna Carta,
explicitly limits the powers of the government.30 The entire system of sep-
aration of powers responds to the legislative omnipotence that the framers
sought to avoid. Thus, even if the framers intended to incorporate the
exact provision of the Magna Carta, that language must be interpreted
with the understanding that the United States Constitution and the Eng-
lish Magna Carta emerge from dramatically different philosophies of
government.
Further, Easterbrook concedes that Coke's works were widely read in
the colonies.31 Indeed, in discussing the adoption of a New York statute
that uses language similar to the Fifth Amendment, Easterbrook notes
that "[t]o the extent [the New York legislators] discussed English com-
mentators, they mentioned Coke but not Blackstone." 2 Faced with this
fact, Easterbrook retreats to an argument that Coke's view of the proce-
dures that transcended parliamentary authority included only a few basic,
theorists." Id. at 69. Similarly, Coke's view of the scope of the "per legem terrae" language was
virtually unanimously accepted at the time of the decision in Dr. Bonham's case. Id. at 50-51.
Thus, notwithstanding their eventual decline, Coke's views were well accepted at the time of the
framing of the Constitution and were far from representing a "solitary view." For an excellent pre-
sentation of the historical evidence that refutes Easterbrook's position, see also Laycock, supra note 3,
at 890-95.
28. Blackstone states that the language "protected every individual of the nation in the free enjoy-
ment of his life, his liberty, and his property, unless declared to be forfeited by the judgment of his
peers or the law of the land." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 417
(lst ed. 1769).
29. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).
30. "In this country written constitutions were deemed essential to protect the rights and liberties
of the people . . . ." Id.
31. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 96.
32. Id. at 96-97. Of course, even if it were not established that the framers took the work of Coke
very seriously, the mere fact that they were familiar with it, even if they were equally familiar with
the work of others such as Blackstone, is strong evidence of their likely intent in using the language
"due process." Had they intended an extremely narrow definition, they certainly would not have used
a term which they knew to have been so broadly interpreted.
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inalienable rights. Moreover, he argues, Coke intended due process to
protect only traditional conceptions of life, liberty, or property.
33 Thus,
Easterbrook concludes, "there is no support in either the structure or his-
tory of the Constitution for a conclusion that Coke's natural law proce-
dural rights should be applied to every subsequent addition to 'life, lib-
erty, or property.' "
Once Easterbrook concedes that the framers were aware of Coke's in-
terpretation of the term "due process" and that Coke's view clearly called
for some judicial intervention, he admits that the framers may well have
understood due process to warrant judicial definition of how much process
is due-at least in certain circumstances. Having admitted that the fram-
ers did conceive of due process as giving the courts the authority to invali-
date legislative schemes, Easterbrook basically concedes his entire thesis.
Surely he can argue that the Court has gone too far in expanding its
definition of life, liberty, or property, but this has no bearing on the ques-
tion of whether the due process clause was intended as a wholly positivis-
tic concept, at least for purposes of determining what process is due. Simi-
larly, the question of exactly what types of safeguards should be required
is wholly different from the question of whether the judiciary has the
power to impose the procedures. Thus, even the staunchest supporter of
the positivist model seems to concede that it simply does not withstand
either his own methodology or close historical scrutiny.
Moreover, Easterbrook's treatment of Coke's view demonstrates that
Easterbrook does not actually interpret the due process clause at all. In
essence, his argument displays two separate conceptions of due process.
His first conception deals exclusively with the types of interests that Coke
would have recognized as protectable-i.e., the natural rights of life, lib-
erty, or property. These interests merit whatever safeguards Coke would
have recognized as fundamental, and, at certain points in his analysis,
Easterbrook seems to concede that the courts can override legislative ac-
tions in these areas. His second conception of due process deals with all
other types of interests. It is here, according to Easterbrook, that the posi-
tivist model of due process comes into play. But if these "new property"
interests or new procedures were not recognized as part of the framers'
due process, then in Easterbrook's view there is no due process right in-
volved at all. No one would argue with the conclusion that when only
nonprotected interests or unnecessary procedures are at issue, the legisla-
33. Conceding the probability that the framers attended to Coke's interpretation when they
framed the term "due process," Easterbrook asserts that "Coke's natural law was a rather tame crea-
ture, satisfied with the inalienable rights to indictment and jury trial. . . .Moreover, Coke's ap-
proach applied only to life, liberty, or property. Those words then described a small collection of
rights." Id.
34. Id. at 98.
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ture may dictate however much or little procedure it sees fit. But at this
point Easterbrook's argument no longer turns on any positivist model.
Rather, he simply argues that the Court has gone too far in defining
property and in defining how much process is due.
An additional flaw in Easterbrook's argument merits attention. Even if
all of his historical arguments are correct, they relate only to the intent
and understanding of the men who framed the Fifth Amendment. But the
men who framed the Fourteenth Amendment clearly had a different un-
derstanding of the term "due process." Those men had read Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., where Justice Curtis, in
his characterization of due process, soundly rejected any notion of unlim-
ited legislative authority to define procedure.35 Thus, when the Four-
teenth Amendment was adopted, the framers and ratifiers clearly knew
that they were putting the courts in charge of procedure. 6
The framers' choice of language does not support, and indeed seems to
negate, the positivist position. Though this conclusion is strongest when
applied to the Fourteenth Amendment, it also holds true for the Fifth
Amendment. Much more significant than the precise language, however,
is the fact that the provisions are part of the Bill of Rights and the Four-
35. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855) (due process is "restraint on the legislative as well as on
the executive and judicial powers. . . and cannot be so constructed to leave congress free to make any
process 'due process of law' by its mere will").
36. Although there is considerable debate on the history of the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Rodney Mott points out that Congressman Bingham "seems to have been the only mem-
ber of Congress who had occasion to tell what he considered due process to mean, and he probably
expressed the general feeling of the House when he declared in answer to a question regarding its
meaning, 'the courts have settled that long ago, and the gentlemen can go and read their decisions."'
R. MOTT, supra note 25, at 164 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1889)).
Murray's Lessee was not the only Supreme Court decision that had interpreted due process in a
broad sense by that time. See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
It is possible that many members of Congress understood the term "due process" in the way that their
own state courts had interpreted it. Those courts had, for the most part, also interpreted "due process"
as a very general term. R. MoTr, supra note 25, at 165. Indeed, there is explicit evidence that some
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment considered the due process guarantee to encompass the right to
a fair trial. See sources cited in Note, Justice Without Favor: Due Process and Separation of Execu-
tive and Judicial Powers in State Government, 94 YALE L.J. 1675, 1676 n.5 (1985).
This realization leads to an intriguing phenomenom. On the one hand, there is a canon of constitu-
tional construction which posits that like terms have like meaning. See Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("It ought not to require argument to reject the
notion that due process of law meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Four-
teenth."); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 532, 535 (1884) (language in Fourteenth Amendment"was used in the same sense and with no greater extent [than in the Fifth Amendment]"). But if
Easterbrook is right about the Fifth Amendment, there were clearly differing understandings of the
meaning of the term "due process" by those who chose to employ it. It would surely put form over
substance to argue that, notwithstanding this clear historical evidence regarding the framers' under-
standing in choosing the phrase "due process" for inclusion in the Fourteenth Amendment, it still
means whatever the framers of the Fifth Amendment understood it to mean. Indeed, such a position
would be especially untenable for a literalist such as Easterbrook, who puts so much stock in the
framers' understanding of their words. See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 92 ("History lays down the
baseline against which other arguments are measured.").
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teenth Amendment, respectively. We will next discuss their place within
the overall structure of the Constitution-an inquiry that settles all doubt
about their intended role.
C. The Structure of the Bill of Rights
The positivist reading of the due process clause also relies on the struc-
ture of the Bill of Rights. In view of the specificity of the Bill of Rights,
the argument proceeds, the due process clause could not have been
designed to allow the courts a more general power "to find and enforce
whatever procedures judges thought important . . . . 37 The structural
argument treats the framers' delineation of certain rights as proof that
they intended protection only of those rights that they explicitly men-
tioned. But if due process is understood as reflecting the framers' intent to
establish a flexible concept that changes over time, it is obvious that the
framers could not have listed all the rights encompassed by the due pro-
cess guarantee.
There is clear evidence that the framers of the Bill of Rights were
aware of their inability to envision each and every scenario that might
arise.3 8 Indeed, many objected to the amendments for the very reason that
they might be understood as embodying the principle expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.9 It is therefore not at all unreasonable to suggest that,
notwithstanding the Bill of Rights' enumeration of specific procedures, the
framers fashioned an open-ended clause to cover both those procedures
that they might have accidently omitted and those that might prove neces-
sary in future times.4
The Bill of Rights was drafted as a response to fears about the power
of a centralized federal government.41 Many were concerned that the new
government would undermine the rights that the colonists held dear. Yet,
37. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 94.
38. Madison, for example, recognized the difficulties inherent in the task of framing a written
constitution when he cautioned that "[n]o language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for
every complex idea." THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 236 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1977).
39. See I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 41 (1965) (supporters of Constitution without Bill of
Rights thought Bill of Rights "was not needed and might be dangerous, jeopardizing the rights not
specified in it").
40. An analogy can be drawn to the Ninth Amendment where the framers also recognized the
limits of their abilities to list exhaustively all rights. The Ninth Amendment "was manifestly intro-
duced to prevent any perverse or ingenious misapplication of the well-known maxim, that an affirma-
tion in particular cases implies a negation in all others; and, e converso, that a negation in particular
cases implies an affirmation in all others." 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1898, at 751-52 (Boston 1833).
41. In Davidson v. New Orleans, the Court described the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment as one of the "series of amendments to the Constitution of the United States, proposed and
adopted immediately after the organization of the government, which were dictated by the jealousy of
the States as further limitations upon the power of the Federal government .... " 96 U.S. 97, 101
(1878).
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according to the positivist approach, the framers proceeded to draft a
clause that put power back in the hands of that very branch. If the right
to define procedure is a wholly legislative function, uncontrolled by the
Constitution, then the due process clause is stripped of its
supermajoritarian import. It makes little sense to interpret the clause as
mandating that legislative determinations be followed. Not only is the
clause then inconsistent with the rest of the Bill of Rights, but it is also
superfluous: The legislature has the power to ensure compliance with its
own laws, even absent the due process provision, by virtue of the neces-
sary and proper clause.
It might be thought that the strict positivist model does not necessarily
render the Fifth Amendment's due process clause a nullity because, as
construed, it provides a legal springboard into federal court, allowing the
judiciary to police administrative and executive compliance with the legis-
lature's procedural commands. Under article III, section 2 of the Consti-
tution, the federal judicial power's reach is limited largely to cases "aris-
ing under" the Constitution and laws of the United States.42 Under this
argument, the due process clause renders executive failure to comply with
legislatively mandated procedures a "federal question" to which the fed-
eral judicial power extends. But this point ignores the fact that, even ab-
sent the due process clause, an allegation of executive failure to comply
with legislatively dictated procedures would provide the necessary "federal
question." Such failure would effectively violate the particular federal
statute dictating the procedures in question.43 Thus, under a strict positiv-
ist model, the due process clause would be wholly unnecessary, and there-
fore meaningless.
Further, as with interpretations regarding the language of the clause,
so conclusions regarding the structure of the Fifth Amendment must be
re-evaluated in light of the Fourteenth Amendment. Not surprisingly,
analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment reveals that its framers did not
intend to empower the individual states to determine how much process is
due. The Fourteenth Amendment was clearly intended to protect individ-
uals from the state's power.44 Moreover, Easterbrook's argument about
the Bill of Rights' specificity does not apply to the Fourteenth Amend-
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
43. It is conceivable that the argument fashioned here has relevance for construction of the Four-
teenth Amendment's due process clause, since the failure of state executive officers to comply with the
procedural commands of the state legislature would not present a question of construction of afederal
statute. However, the framers of the Fifth Amendment imposed no procedural requirements on the
states, but instead chose only to limit congressional action. Thus, the strict positivist model renders the
constitutional guarantee of procedural due process a complete nullity.
44. See H. FLACK, ADOPTION OF THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT 94-97 (1908); R. MOT,
supra note 25, at 163-64.
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ment, which lists no specific procedural safeguards. Although Easterbrook
might argue that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood
due process to mean service of actual legal process, it is rather absurd to
think that, of all the crucial safeguards that had been recognized, the
framers singled out that protection as the one that would be forced on the
states.45
Thus, even apart from questions about the framers' intent, the structure
and purpose of both the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
militate against the positivists' conclusion. It is highly unlikely that the
framers would have undertaken the meaningless exercise that the positiv-
ist model presumes.
D. The "Paradox" Rationale
Advocates of the positivist approach claim additional support for their
position in the Court's recent adoption of a positivist method for ascertain-
ing whether a "property" interest exists in a given case. In the companion
cases of Board of Regents v. Roth
46 and Perry v. Sindermann,7 the
Court considered the claim that a professor possesses a constitutionally
protected property interest in his academic appointment and therefore has
the right to due process prior to being dismissed from that position. In
analyzing the plaintiffs' claims, the court explained that "[t]o have a prop-
erty interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an ab-
stract need or desire for it . . . . He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it."'48 Such entitlements, at least as they concern
property, the Court continued, "are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law . . .,,9
This shift in the Court's method of defining property was a dramatic
one.50 The important point for present purposes, however, is that the
45. Of course, the meaning given the term prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
also makes this interpretation impossible. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
46. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
47. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
48. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
49. Id.
50. Prior to these cases the Court had never defined the term "property" by examining positive
law. Instead, the Court had relied on the common law's characterization of property. See, e.g., Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (property right in control of
estate trust account); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (property interest in possession of land).
See generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667,
1717-18 (1975). Aside from the infamous right-privilege distinction, see generally Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968), this
approach served to protect most interests that were worth litigating. Eventually, in some cases the
Court did not even tie the presence of a property interest back to common law, but found a property
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Court's decision in these two cases seemed to be the logical stepping stone
toward recognizing that the legislature may delineate the scope of the pro-
cedural safeguards, as well as the substantive content of a given right. If
the legislature has the greater authority to abolish a given right totally, it
must, afortiori, possess the lesser authority to modify some of the proce-
dures that come into play when that right is terminated.51 Moreover, the
line between substance and procedure seems to be an imaginary one. Any
legislative definition of a substantive property right must include proce-
dural aspects, and there can be no principled reason for allowing the leg-
islature complete control over one aspect while not allowing them any
control over the other. In short, the commentators had uncovered a "para-
dox"' 2 which seemed to make a strong case for total adoption 53-or alter-
natively, total rejection-of the positivist model."
It is certainly true that adopting the pure positivist approach resolves
the difficult paradox that results when the legislature is allowed to define
only the substantive, but not the procedural, aspect of a given property
interest. Yet by solving the paradox in this manner, one creates an even
greater problem: If all aspects of due process are open to legislative defini-
tion, then of what possible value is the constitutional guarantee of due
process of law?5 5 The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment both
interest based on the fact that the interest in question was obviously of great importance to the indi-
vidual. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970). The decisions in Roth and
Sindermann changed all that. Now, apparently, governmental bodies are free to do away with proce-
dural safeguards to the extent they are willing to recognize no substantive entitlement.
51. It is not clear whether this reasoning applies only to the "new property"-that which was
once considered "privilege"-or whether it extends to traditional property, and for that matter, life
and liberty as well. Professor Laycock argues that the positivist entitlement theory cannot logically be
stopped at the "new property." Laycock, supra note 3, at 879-82. He explains that "[a] capital
punishment statute defines the scope of the right to life, just as a civil service statute defines the scope
of the right to a government job. . . .Every individual enters life subject to legislative specification of
the conditions that will cause him to forfeit it." Id. at 881.
52. See Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, DUE PRocEss: NoMos XVIII 182,
190 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
53. It was not long before this argument was being raised by Justices of the Court. See, e.g.,
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1974) (Justice Rehnquist writing for three justices arguing
citizens "must take the bitter with the sweet"). The argument has consistently been rejected, however.
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1492-93 (1985) ("[Ilt is settled that the
'bitter with the sweet' approach misconceives the constitutional guarantee . . . .The categories of
substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere
tautology.").
54. Because the paradox results from the Court's allowing the legislature to define substance but
not procedure, it can be eliminated by the Court's either allowing the legislature to define both sub-
stance and procedure, or alternatively, allowing the legislature to define neither substance nor proce-
dure. For a brief discussion of two of the many alternative solutions to the "paradox," see infra notes
115 & 129.
55. Professor Mashaw accurately portrays the problem in his hypothetical discussion between a
fired public school teacher and a federal judge. After the judge explains to the teacher that his interest
in his job and the procedures surrounding its termination are contingent on state law, the teacher
exclaims, "if they had agreed by contract or regulation to give me a hearing, I don't see why I would
need constitutional protection in the first place." Mashaw, supra note 3, at 891 (emphasis added).
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embody counter-majoritarian principles de-emphasizing legislative author-
ity. But their unique role is forfeited if they hinge on that very legislature
to define their scope. What need for a provision which merely dictates that
legislative determinations must be obeyed?
56 To understand due process of
law in this manner is to write it out of the Constitution.
Thus, the three arguments offered to bolster the positivist theory actu-
ally provide little support. Not the language and history of the phrase
"due process," nor the structure of the Bill of Rights, nor, finally, the
perceived paradox in the Court's opinions, can sustain the positivist
argument.
III. GIVING CONTENT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION OF
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. The Methodology of Procedural Due Process: An Overview
In analyzing the merit-or, more precisely, lack of merit-of the posi-
tivist argument, we have addressed the question of whose job it
is-legislature or courts-to delineate how much process is due before any
given deprivation of a protectable interest. Having established that this
task ultimately belongs to the judiciary, we now attempt to develop a
principled method by which the courts can decide just how much process
is constitutionally necessary.
The Supreme Court has employed various methods to ascertain
whether a specific procedure is required in a given case. At first the Court
simply looked to the English practice and held that the due process clause
had incorporated the procedures that were integral to the English common
law system.57 It quickly abandoned this approach, however, choosing in-
stead to ask whether a given procedure was essential to modern-as op-
posed to 17th century-notions of fairness.
58
Recently the Court seems to have abandoned this approach, and instead
has applied a balancing scheme: The probable value of additional proce-
dural safeguards in protecting an interest is weighed against the state's
fiscal and administrative burden in providing them.
59 Under this method-
ology, even those procedures once considered essential to rudimentary due
process are now open to question.
In this Section, we will discuss the various methods that the Court has
used to determine the content of procedural due process. Though the
56. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 535 (1978) (although positivist theory suf-
fers no internal contradiction, it ignores structure and purpose of constitutional clauses).
57. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 
277
(1855).
58. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908).
59. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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Court correctly discarded the pure historical approach focusing on
whether the framers intended a specific procedure, the types of procedures
traditionally required shed light on the general values that the clause pro-
tects. Discerning the values that due process protects is the critical step in
the development of a model for adjudicating due process claims. Though
different deprivations indeed demand different procedures, we argue that
the balancing of interests must never be conducted in a manner that
ignores recognized core values.60 Certain specific procedures may not be
necessary in certain cases, but only because the appropriate due process
values are otherwise protected. Finally, we will examine some of the val-
ues that shape the application of due process.61
1. The Historical Approach
The Court's first discussion of the historical approach to due process
came in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.6 2 In that
case, the Court adopted a historical method for determining the proce-
dures mandated by the clause, focusing on the types of procedures that the
framers of the Fifth Amendment would have understood to be "the law of
the land."63 The "frozen-in-history" approach did not last long. In
Hurtado v. California,6' the Court rejected the notion that the framers'
understanding limited the scope of the procedures required by the clause.
No matter how offensive a practice is to a modern society, it does not
violate the due process clause if "in substance, [it] has been immemorially
the actual law of the land .... ,,15
The Hurtado Court's rejection of an absolutely fixed due process clause
was grounded in the nature of law itself. To fix a definition, the Court
feared, "would be to stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness
attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians.""6 Though the Court
urged the concept of an evolving due process, it did not explain why the
law could progress only in the direction of less procedural protections.
The decision protected the government-but not individuals-from the
dangers of "the laws of the Medes and the Persians."
By the time of its decision in Twining v. New Jersey, 7 the Court
60. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 88-143 and accompanying text.
62. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
63. Id. at 277 ("[Wie must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the
common and statue [sic] law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown
not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after
the settlement of this country.").
64. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
65. Id. at 528.
66. Id. at 529.
67. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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seemed to recognize the deficiencies in the one-directional progress ap-
proach adopted in Hurtado. Addressing the question of whether states
could compel self-incrimination in criminal cases, the Court explained
that the meaning of the clause "should be gradually ascertained by the
process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of the
cases as they arise."68 Though historical practice clearly condoned compel-
ling self-incrimination, the Court nonetheless questioned whether the free-
dom from self-incrimination was a "fundamental principle of liberty and
justice.""9 The historical absence or presence of a procedure was simply
another evidentiary factor in the overall equation for determining whether
a given procedural safeguard was sufficiently fundamental to warrant the
clause's protection.
2. The Evolution of the Balancing Tests
Having decided that history provides neither a floor nor a ceiling to
modern due process, the Court began to struggle with the task of deter-
mining on a case-by-case basis whether a given procedure violated due
process. For a long time, the Court seemed to deal in a rather intuitive
way with the question of how much process was due.
70 This has recently
given way to a detailed-and somewhat mechanical-balancing scheme.
Unfortunately, the recent mechanization of the test has led the Court to
disregard many of the subtleties that the "intuitive" approach necessarily
took into account. During the Court's "intuitive" period, the Justices gen-
erally tended to treat due process as Justice Stewart treated obscenity-as
recognizable, albeit undefinable. This ad hoc, open-ended approach left
the Court vulnerable to the obvious criticism that the Justices were forc-
ing their personal notions of fairness on the nation.
71 Further unevenness
68. Id. at 106; see also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877) (employing language of
gradual inclusion and exclusion).
69. Twining, 211 U.S. at 106. There have been many similar formulations of the due process
standard. For instance, Justice Frankfurter asked whether procedures are required for the "protection
of ultimate decency in a civilized society," Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). Justice Cardozo has said, "due process of law requires that the proceedings
shall be fair . . . ." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934).
70. The Court did try "manfully to avoid" resting its decisions on nothing but the personal pref-
erences of the Justices. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 344 (1957). According to Kadish, the two main analytic techniques
the Court used to do this were "a respectful deference" to the state courts and legislatures whose
decisions were being reviewed and "an attempt to rest conclusions upon external and objective evi-
dence." Id. at 327.
71.
[T]he 'natural law' formula which the Court uses to reach its conclusion in this case should be
abandoned as an incongruous excrescence on our Constitution. I believe that formula to be
itself a violation of our Constitution, in that it subtly conveys to courts, at the expense of
legislatures, ultimate power over public policies in fields where no specific provision of the
Constitution limits legislative power.
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in the application of the due process guarantee resulted from the Court's
long-standing recognition that not all relationships between the govern-
ment and its citizens would be treated identically. For example, the Court
had long held that the boundaries of due process are very different in the
agency rulemaking process from those in the adjudicatory process.7 1 Yet
the "basic elements of fairness" inquiry tended to lead to the conclusion
that the individual in an administrative proceeding should be afforded
procedural safeguards identical to those afforded the individual in tradi-
tional judicial proceedings. The realities of the burgeoning administrative
state of the late 1960's, however, demonstrated that the implementation of
such procedures across the board was not possible. 3
To get around this obstacle, the Court modified the fairness inquiry. It
began to balance an individual's interest in a procedure against the gov-
ernment's cost in providing the procedures. Obviously, some degree of bal-
ancing had always gone into the Court's "intuitive" decisionmaking, if
only implicitly, and therefore the fact that it was now being done a bit
more openly caused little alteration in the doctrinal development.
Once the Court's balance became explicit, litigants began to stress the
importance of their substantive interests, while the government urged the
innocuousness of its deprivations. 4 Soon the Court's analysis began to re-
flect these formulations. For example, in Cafeteria & Restaurant Work-
ers Union v. McElroy, 5 the Court emphasized the minimal nature of the
deprivation in holding that a short order cook had no right to a proceeding
before being fired from her government job. By contrast, the Court in
Goldberg v. Kelly7" placed great emphasis on the hardship that welfare
recipients endure when their benefits are terminated. Thus, the extent of
the hardship that the threatened deprivation would create had become a
significant factor in the Court's due process analysis.
The Court entered its "mechanical" due process phase with its decision
in Mathews v. Eldridge,7 7 which laid out the specific factors that should
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 75 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
72. See, e.g., Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) ("Many requirements essential in
strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with [in the administrative forum].").
73. Especially in entitlement programs, there has always been the concern that money spent im-
proving procedures would deplete funds available for the substance of the program. See, e.g., Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 278 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) ("The Court apparently feels that this
decision will benefit the poor and needy. In my judgment the eventual result will be just the
opposite.").
74. For example, Professor Rubin has pointed out that "the welfare rights movement had pro-
duced a change in emphasis. Commentators were focusing on the intrinsic importance of the benefits
themselves, instead of the unfairness of government procedures for determining these benefits." Rubin,
supra note 19, at 1062.
75. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
76. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
77. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
The Yale Law Journal
shape its balancing process. In that case, the plaintiff claimed that he had
been denied due process when the Social Security Administration termi-
nated his disability benefit payments without an evidentiary hearing. In
holding that the plaintiff had no right to such a hearing, the Court an-
nounced three factors to be balanced in ascertaining the process due in
each case:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Govern-
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.7
According to this test, the Court looks only to the individual's interest
in the substantive right, totally ignoring any "non-instrumental" interests
that the individual-or society-may have in procedure for procedure's
sake. The word "fairness" did not appear in the balancing test; the Court
apparently chose to focus upon considerations of economic efficiency in-
stead. The notions of elemental fairness that had been so dispositive under
the "intuitive" approach were now abandoned in favor of the
new-economically efficient-due process.
3. The Problem of Balancing: A House Without a Floor Is Not a
House At All
The development of the Mathews balancing test gave rise to a structure
within which an individual can possess an undisputed property inter-
est-and thus, a clear right to due process-but have no right to any pro-
cedures at all. In other words, balancing can lead to the anomalous result
that an individual will have a clear due process right to no process. Such a
result is surely problematic in light of the explicit constitutional require-
ment that no life, liberty, or property be taken without due process of law.
Of course, balancing is not unique to the due process clause. Through-
out constitutional adjudication, the government's interest is frequently
weighed against, for example, the individual's right to free speech, 
7 free
exercise of religion,80 or some other fundamental interest.8" Yet the bal-
78. Id. at 335.
79. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
80. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
81. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (balancing state's interest in potentiality of
human life against woman's discounted right to privacy).
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ancing in these areas is far different from that informing procedural due
process.
When a court overrides an individual's right to free speech, it must be
sensitive to the fact that it is subordinating an explicit constitutional right
to some government objective. In so doing, the court is limited doctrinally
in the kinds of governmental interests to which it can give credence. 2
Moreover, that the issue before the court is whether it will override the
Constitution undoubtedly limits the court's willingness to accept the gov-
ernmental incursion. Under the current method of adjudicating due pro-
cess claims, courts are relieved of the burden of finding that a governmen-
tal interest overrides a clear constitutional safeguard. Instead, they may
hold that, in light of the government's interests, the individual simply has
no due process right to the procedure in question. Politically, it is far
easier for judges to tell a litigant that "the Constitution gives you no right
in this case," than it is to tell her that "the Constitution gives you a right,
but in this case, the government's interest is strong enough to cancel it."
An additional, significant factor distinguishes procedural due process
balancing from the balancing employed for most other constitutional
rights. By their very nature, procedural safeguards impose administrative
costs and burdens on the government that would not otherwise exist. At
the same time, the benefits of such safeguards are not always immediately
recognizable. Often it is not clear that the ultimate outcome in a particu-
lar case will be more just or efficient when specific procedures are em-
ployed than when they are not. In an important sense, then, the benefits
of procedural due process-at least when measured from a purely effi-
ciency standpoint-are prophylactic in nature. An efficiency-oriented bal-
ancing test, therefore, weighs an inevitable and immediately recognizable
administrative cost against a largely prophylactic interest in the use of
specific procedural protections. Thus, it is likely that the Court's balanc-
ing test, lacking any minimum floor of procedural protection, will gener-
ally find in favor of the governmental interest. 83
82. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Court rejected the state's arguments about the admin-
istrative inconvenience of distinguishing between bona fide religious believers and others. 374 U.S.
398, 406-09 (1963).
83. In the words of Professor Saphire: "Aside from its questionable assumption that the societal
costs of procedural protection can reliably be predicted, utility theory tends to minimize the value of
less quantifiable factors . . . by setting them off against more easily identifiable and often intuitively
more compelling conceptions of the public good." Saphire, supra note 3, at 155. Saphire concludes,
"[in this respect, utilitarianism is hostile to any theory of due process that treats individual dignity as
a serious, operative societal value." Id.; see also Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or
Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARv. L. REV. 592, 596 (1985) ("The inevitable result [of utilitarian policy
analysis] is not only that 'soft' variables-such as the value of vindicating a fundamental right or
preserving human dignity-tend to be ignored or understated, but also that entire problems are re-
duced to terms that misstate their structure and that ignore the nuances that give these problems their
full character."). Id. For a more general critique of the Court's analysis in Mathews, see Mashaw,
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This problem is compounded when the Court adopts a deferential
stance toward legislative balancing. Because the basic issues to be bal-
anced relate to fiscal objectives, the Court has at times been reluctant to
hold that the legislature weighed the issues improperly. After all, if the
test is efficiency, who is better equipped, or motivated, to deal with the
problem than the legislative branch?
84
4. The Need for an Intermediate Approach
Neither the historical nor the wholesale balancing approach succeeds in
realizing the goals of due process. The historical approach fails, as the
Court recognized early in its due process jurisprudence, because it cannot
adequately respond to changing circumstances and perceptions of justice.
The balancing approach fails for the diametrically opposite reason. Its
inadequacy lies in its inability to take into account the traditional concerns
of procedural justice that the framers most certainly intended when they
shaped the two amendments. What is needed, therefore, is a model that
embraces the historical approach's adherence to traditional values and the
balancing approach's responsiveness to changing reality. In the next sec-
tion of this Article, we propose a model that accomplishes this goal.
5. A Proposed Model: Distinguishing Due Process Values from Spe-
cific Procedures
Apart from the period during which the Court employed a purely his-
torical approach, the contours of the procedural due process requirement
have always been subject to a disturbing degree of flexibility. In particu-
lar, the indeterminacy of Mathews' balancing test threatens to undermine
wholly the viability of the guarantee. It is possible to devise a model of
procedural due process that simultaneously allows the flexibility central to
the due process concept as it has evolved, while providing a principled and
workable structure. Due process need be flexible mainly in terms of the
-specific procedures that courts require. The values that the clause repre-
sents, on the other hand, are more enduring. Once the values are dis-
cerned, a court's task is to assess the manner in which these values may
best be realized. Various balancing texts may lead to a conclusion about
how a given value can best be realized at the lowest cost, but under this
model balancing can never, under circumstances short of an extreme and
The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. El-
dridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHi. L. REv. 28 (1976).
84. As one commentator points out, however, such interest balancing is clearly inappropriate "be-
cause it transforms the right to due process from a constitutional limit upon the total power of govern-
ment over the individual into merely an institutional check upon whether the state's procedural poli-
cies in fact promote the general welfare." Note, supra note 4, at 1511.
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overwhelming emergency, lead to the conclusion that one of the values is
outweighed by a competing governmental interest.8 5
Though recognition of the procedures deemed necessary in the past does
not answer whether those same procedures are still needed, it does help
shed light on the types of values that due process encompasses. Indeed, it
might be worthwhile to establish a rebuttable presumption that proce-
dures historically required are still necessary for the achievement of due
process values. In deciding whether that presumption remains valid, the
Court's task is to translate traditional due process values into the modern
context.
This description of the Court's role seems consistent with the notion of
gradual "inclusion and exclusion" that the Court announced when it first
adopted a flexible model of due process."6 The model does demand that
certain values remain constant. The practical methods of fostering these
values, however, might differ today from the methods that were available
or expedient two centuries ago.
The following section examines the different theoretical values that the
concept of procedural due process could be thought to serve, and attempts
to delineate the specific procedural protections required today to maintain
those values. It is our contention that the one procedural protection that is
clearly necessary for the fulfillment of all of the goals of due process is the
participation of a truly independent adjudicator.
IV. DUE PROCESS VALUES AND THE RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT
ADJUDICATOR
According to the model described above, the notion of a "flexible" due
process clause is accurate only to the extent that it recognizes the court's
authority to decide that a fixed due process value can be accomplished
through procedures different from those used previously. If a given value
cannot be protected absent the use of a specific procedure, then that proce-
dure must be deemed essential to the achievement of due process in all
cases. It is our position that the participation of an independent adjudica-
tor is such an essential safeguard, and may be the only one. Even though
the Supreme Court has often stated that the core rights of due process are
notice and hearing, 7 we shall demonstrate that, under certain circum-
85. Like any other constitutional provision, due process can be subordinated to some extraordi-
narily pressing governmental need. As Justice Goldberg put it, "while the Constitution protects
against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
86. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985) ("An essential
prindple of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property 'be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."') (quoting Mullane v. Central Hano-
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stances, the values of due process might arguably be safeguarded absent
those specific procedural protections. None of the core values of due pro-
cess, however, can be fulfilled without the participation of an independent
adjudicator.
A. "Instrumental Concerns"
According to the instrumental conception of due process, the purpose of
the clause is to ensure the most accurate decision possible. The due pro-
cess protections such as notice, hearing, and right to counsel are valuable
because they contribute to the goal of accuracy. The Supreme Court has
long relied upon this rationale in shaping its conception of the due process
clause."" In Mathews v. Eldridge,89 for example, the Court's three-part
balancing test seemed to focus exclusively on instrumental concerns.
The instrumental conception of due process focuses on the individual's
interest in having an opportunity to convince the decisionmaker that he
deserves the right at issue. Examination of the instrumental value demon-
strates that it cannot be furthered without the participation of an adjudi-
cator truly independent of the governmental body involved in the case.
As might be expected in light of the Court's emphasis on instrumental
concerns, most of the procedures that have fallen within the scope of the
due process clause deal with the individual's opportunity to argue his case
effectively. The rights to notice, hearing, counsel, transcript, and to calling
and cross-examining witnesses all relate directly to the accuracy of the
adjudicative process. These procedural safeguards are of no real value,
however, if the decisionmaker bases his findings on factors other than his
assessment of the evidence before him. For example, if the individual
seeking to enforce his rights is black, and the adjudicator is racially
prejudiced and would therefore never find in favor of a black person re-
gardless of the weight of the evidence, all of the procedural guarantees of
ver Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).
88. In many cases the Court has focused exclusively on the accuracy value in determining what
procedures are needed. For example, in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977), the Court explained that
although the right to contest a driver's license revocation "might make the licensee feel that he has
received more personal attention . . . it would not serve to protect any substantive right." Id. at 114.
The Court therefore held that there was no due process right to an oral hearing. But see Marshall v.
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (discussing due process value of promoting "participation").
Individual justices have, moreover, touched upon the non-instrumental themes in their concurrences
and dissents. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (inmates
retain "at the very minimum the right to be treated with dignity"); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter J., concurring) ("generating the feeling, so im-
portant to a popular government, that justice has been done").
89. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Although the language in the Mathews test is somewhat ambiguous as to
what type of individual interests enter the calculus, the Court's application of the test to the facts of
the case made it quite clear that it was focusing on solely instrumental-accuracy-oriented-interests.
There was no premium put on the individual's interest in procedure qua procedure, i.e., for the
dignitary values that procedures implicate.
476
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hearing, notice, counsel, transcript and the examination of witnesses are
rendered irrelevant. Similarly, if the adjudicator is himself an integral
part of the governmental body on the other side of the case, then it is
likely that his decision will be based on considerations other than the mer-
its as developed by the evidence. The government would, in effect, be the
judge of its own case. Once again, traditional procedural protections, how-
ever meticulously adhered to, become irrelevant.
Of course, it is not immediately evident at what point the adjudicator's
bias or lack of independence from a government body becomes so great
that the use of traditional procedural protections becomes a sham. The
problem of defining adjudicatory independence requires detailed discus-
sion. 90 The important point here, however, is that the use of an "indepen-
dent" adjudicator is a sine qua non of procedural due process.
Thus, it is clear that the use of an independent adjudicator constitutes a
necessary condition for the realization of the instrumental value of proce-
dural due process. An argument might be fashioned that, at least in ex-
treme circumstances, its use may also serve as a sufficient condition. Judge
Henry Friendly has noted that as the independence of the decisionmaker
increases, the need for other procedural safeguards decreases.91 Of course,
the use of traditional procedural guarantees can enhance the accuracy of
the decison of a well-intentioned and independent adjudicator. But if the
costs of such procedures in a particular situation are prohibitive, the use
of an independent adjudicator can at least assure that a good-faith effort
to achieve an accurate conclusion will be made. The converse is not true.
In light of these considerations, it is surprising that the Court has not
always included the right to an independent tribunal in its list of the core
elements of due process. The Court has frequently included only the
rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard in that list.92 Yet in some
situations even these basic elements may be abandoned without adversely
affecting the factfinding process. For example, the right to an opportunity
to be heard has typically required an oral hearing.9" Yet, the advantage of
90. See infra notes 144-80 and accompanying text.
91.
[T]here is wisdom in recognizing that the further the tribunal is removed from the agency
and thus from any suspicion of bias, the less may be the need for other procedural safe-
guards. . . . Instead of the Goldberg formulation permitting a welfare official (even with
some involvement in the very case) to act as a decisionmaker as long as he had not "partici-
pated in making the determination under review," but requiring a corresponding heavy dose of
judicialization, agencies might be offered an option of less procedural formality if the deci-
sionmaker were not a member of the agency and of still less if, as in England, he were not a
full-time government employee at all.
Friendly, supra note 4, at 1279.
92. See infra note 87.
93. In 1958 Professor Davis defined the term "hearing" as any oral proceeding before a tribu-
nal." K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.01, at 407 (1st ed. 1958). Since that time,
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oral rather than written presentations is at best minimal in many situa-
tions. Courts of appeals frequently decide cases on the basis of written
briefs without giving the litigants an opportunity to argue the case orally,
a practice which has been upheld by many courts on many occasions.9 4 In
the initial factfinding process, too, certain cases do not lend themselves to
oral presentation. In cases involving complex, technical evidence, it is
quite plausible that written presentation of evidence is more helpful than
oral presentation would be. 5 Indeed, under certain circumstances, oral
argument may undermine the process of accurate factfinding because it
may lack precision or detail more readily captured in written form.96
The right to counsel is another example of a safeguard that can be
denied under certain circumstances without debilitating the factfinding
process.97 Many small claims courts and administrative proceedings func-
tion without the participation of counsel,98 and if the adjudicator is pre-
pared to take a role consistent with the needs of the situation, there is no
reason the parties cannot achieve a fair and accurate decision in such
cases.99 Similarly, without exploring them in detail, the rights to cross-
however, he too has conceded that the answer to the question whether "due process require[s] an
opportunity to present oral argument . . . is an unqualified no. ... 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRA-
T5VE LAW TREATISE § 10.9, at 337 (2d ed. 1978).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 484 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 980
(1974); NLRB v. Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestor Workers, 476 F.2d 275 (3d Cir.
1973). See generally 2 K. DAvss, supra note 93, § 10.9, at 337-39.
95. Cf. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (holding written reports of examining doctors
admissible as evidence in social security hearings); Long v. United States, 59 F.2d 602, 603-04 (4th
Cir. 1932) (physician's "testimony when produced is ordinarily a mere recital of what is contained in
their reports, to which they must look for the purpose of refreshing the memory; and every one with
experience in conducting litigation knows that as a matter of fact such [written] reports are more
reliable than the memory of the witnesses who made them"). The provisions allowing for written
interrogatories in additon to oral deposition also seem to recognize that certain types of evidence are
best dealt with through written submissions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
96. Judge Friendly "object[s] to requiring oral presentation as a universal rule. Determination
whether or not an oral hearing is required should depend on the susceptibility of the particular subject
matter to written presentation, on the ability of the complainant to understand the case against him
and to present his arguments effectively in written form, and on the administrative costs." Friendly,
supra note 4, at 1281; see also Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for
Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MicH. L. REV. 111, 125-30 (1972)
(discussing different techniques necessary in "polycentric controversies").
97. In the context of prison discipline, for example, the Court has recognized that "insertion of
counsel ...would inevitably give the proceedings a more adversary cast and tend to reduce their
utility as a means to further correctional goals." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570 (1974). Our
discussion of the due process right to counsel does not, of course, deal with the independent question
of the right to counsel under the Sixth and Seventh amendments.
98. See generally Friendly, supra note 4, at 1287-91.
99. The role of the adjudicator necessarily varies with the context and the ability of the litigants.
In Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983), Justice Brennan concurred in the Court's decision to
allow the Social Security Administration to promulgate certain rules in place of individual adjudica-
tion of specific questions. He stressed that:
[Tihere is a 'basic obligation' on the ALJ in these nonadversarial proceedings to develop a full
and fair record, which obligation rises to a "'special duty . . .to scrupulously and conscien-
tiously explore for all relevant facts!" where an unrepresented claimant has not waived
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examination, calling witnesses, and the making of a record seem to fall
within the category of rights that can be done away with in certain cir-
cumstances without sacrificing the fairness of the procedure.Y00 This fact
distinguishes the right to an unbiased adjudicator from all the other core
procedural safeguards.
We should emphasize that we do not intend to demean the importance
of these various procedural protections to the attainment of the goals of
due process. In many instances, their absence will-and should-be
deemed to amount to a departure from fair procedure, and therefore con-
stitute a violation of due process. Our point is, simply, that at least under
certain circumstances, it might be possible to fashion a hearing that meets
the requirements of due process, even though one or another of these pro-
cedural elements is absent. The same cannot be said of the use of an inde-
pendent adjudicator: Once that protection is dispensed with, the provision
of all other procedural safeguards cannot cure the violation of fundamen-
tal fairness. Thus, our goal is not to devalue the traditionally accepted
procedural protections, but rather to accentuate the value of the use of an
independent adjudicator, relative to those other protections.
Under the value-oriented due process model that we propose,1"1 the fact
that a procedure is necessary in order to fulfill a value is enough to show
that the procedure is mandated by the dictates of due process. In view of
the unique relationship that the participation of an independent judge has
to the key due process value of accurate decisionmaking, it is evident that
there can never be due process without a sufficiently independent adjudi-
cator. Review of historical evidence demonstrates that the right to an inde-
pendent adjudicator was considered a crucial element of procedural justice
by the common law, by those that established the law of the colonies, and,
perhaps most important, by the Framers of the United States Constitu-
tion. This historically fundamental role adds significant weight to the con-
clusion that the right to an independent adjudicator constitutes the floor of
due process.
The rule Nemo Judex in re sua, or that no man is to be a judge in his
own cause, was so central a tenet of the common law that Lord Coke
insisted upon a court's right to invalidate acts of Parliament that ignored
counsel."
Id. at 471 (quoting Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1364 (11th Cir. 1982)).
100. See Friendly, supra note 4, at 1282-87, 1291-92. Judge Friendly points out that, as a gen-
eral matter, "English judges and scholars consider that we [Americans] have simply gone mad" in our
tendency to judicialize administrative procedures. Id. at 1269. Thus, it is all the more relevant that
one of the two elements of "natural justice" which British courts hold essential in all adjudicatory
contexts is the right to an unbiased adjudicator. Id. at 1269 n.10. See H. WADE, ADMINmSTRArvE
LAW 175-86 (3d ed. 1971).
101. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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it. In Dr. Bonham's Case,102 a graduate of Cambridge University brought
a false imprisonment action against the Board of Censors of the Royal
College of Physicians. The Board had had him imprisoned for refusing to
subject himself to its competency tests. Had the Board found Bonham in-
competent, it was authorized by statute to subject him to imprisonment
and a fine, one half of which would go to the College itself. Lord Coke
held that the statute in question could not possibly have vested a finding
power in the College. The College itself was an interested party because it
would reap a financial benefit by finding the accused guilty. Though Lord
Coke construed the statute narrowly, had he not, the inherent bias of the
tribunal would have invalidated the Act as "against common right and
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed."'
0 3
The framers brought this concern about potential adjudicatory bias
from England, and a number of provisions of the United States Constitu-
tion reflect the framers' sensitivity to the problem. Indeed, several provi-
sions of Article III show that the framers considered judicial independence
crucial to the success of the new nation.
Article III provides that "[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be di-
minished during their Continuance in Office.' 110 4 Hamilton characterized
the good behavior provision as "one of the most valuable of the modern
improvements in the practice of government."' 5 In an address to the peo-
ple of New York, he explained that one of the goals of the provision was
to protect the judiciary from being overpowered by the other branches of
government. And he continued:
[I]t is not with a view to infractions of the constitution only, that the
independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the
effects of occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes ex-
tend no farther than to the injury of the private rights of particular
classes of citizens, by unjust and partisan laws. Here also the firm-
ness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the
severity and confining the operation of such laws.'
Hamilton further explained that the good behavior provision was "con-
formable to the most approved of the State constitutions" and that the
"experience of Great Britain affords an illustrious comment on the excel-
102. 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 8 Coke 114(a) (1610).
103. Id. at 648, 8 Coke at 118(b).
104. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
105. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 503 (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1937).
106. Id. at 509.
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lence of the institution. °10 7 Thus, it is evident that the concern for inde-
pendent adjudicators was a common theme in both the Colonies and in
England.
The salary provisions of Article III were similarly designed to protect
the independence of the judiciary. They were based on the premise that
"[iln the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsis-
tence amounts to a power over his will."1" 8 Finally, the diversity jurisdic-
tion provided for in Article 111'09 also points to the framers' sensitivity to
the distorting effects of judicial bias. Chief Justice Marshall explained:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of
every description, it is not less true that the Constitution itself either
entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indul-
gence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has es-
tablished national tribunals for the decision of controversies between
aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different states.110
That the framers worried over the more distant possibility of a court's
partiality toward the resident of its own state further underscores the cen-
trality of their concern about independence.""'
B. Non-Instrumental Values
Notwithstanding its language in Mathews,""2 many of the Supreme
Court's decisions cannot be understood in purely instrumental terms.
Some of these decisions address the boundaries of procedural due process
in the criminal context, but they apply equally in the civil context. Both
types of cases may involve deprivations of life, liberty or property, thus
bringing the due process clause into play; indeed, in many cases a non-
criminal deprivation can be a more grievous loss than a criminal penalty.
107. Id. at 503.
108. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 583 (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1937) (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court has recently taken note of the great importance that these provisions have in
ensuring judicial independence. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982).
109. "The judicial power shall extend to ... controversies ... between citizens of different
states." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
110. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 61, 87 (1809). For a general
discussion of the reasons for diversity jurisdiction, see Friendly, The Historic Basis of DiversityJuris-
diction, 41 HARV. L. REv. 483 (1928).
111. The possibility of bias in favor of a fellow state resident is certainly far more remote than
many situations in which the Court has refused to disqualify itself. See infra notes 150-80 and ac-
companying text.
112. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews's emphasis on instrumental values is
discussed supra at note 77 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the criminal due process cases are fertile ground for discovering due
process values.
The cases on coerced confessions are prime examples of the Court's
merging of instrumental and non-instrumental values. In Brown v. Mis-
sissippi,11 the Court overturned a conviction based on confessions that
had been obtained after a number of brutal beatings. If accurate factfind-
ing were the only objective of the cases beginning with Brown, one would
expect the Court to have found that any obviously true confession,
whether or not coerced, is admissible. But the Court sought a broader
rationale, explaining that "neither the likelihood that the confession is un-
true nor the preservation of the individual's freedom of will is the sole
interest at stake."114 These non-instrumental values are discussed more
fully in the next section of this Article. The point here is that these values
inform at least some of the Court's due process cases.
1 15
C. Evaluating The Non-Instrumental Values
Professor Mashaw's thorough canvassing of the values underlying his
dignitary due process theory provides a useful springboard for our analy-
sis.116 In discussing these values, we must determine the extent to which
each is truly "non-instrumental." In other words, to what degree is each
value actually separate and distinct from the "instrumental" concern of
producing an accurate finding? Our analysis will demonstrate that most of
the proposed values are inherently tied to the instrumental justification,
and cannot be separated from the individual's interest in his entitlement.
Because each of them, with one possible exception, is a variation on the
instrumental theme, each of them, in the end, requires the same basic
113. 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936).
114. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
115. Some academics have argued that no due process case is explainable on purely instrumental
grounds, at least after Roth and Sindermann. This argument has been raised as a response to the
"paradox" that those two cases created when they held that the legislature has uncontrolled discretion
to shape substantive rights, while courts are responsible for defining the procedures necessary before
an individual can be deprived of those rights. If due process protects only instrumental concerns,
commentators argue, it makes no sense for courts to involve themselves at all. But, argue these schol-
ars, there is a wide array of non-instrumental values that do justify-and in fact mandate-judicial
definition of due process. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 3; Michelman, supra note 3. Because Easter-
brook's positivist position basically writes due process out of the Constitution, see supra notes 37-66
and accompanying text, this alternative explanation appears quite attractive.
But the relevance of the non-instrumental concerns is not dependent on the fact that they offer a
solution to the paradox. Even if one accepts some alternative solution to the paradox, the fact remains
that due process, as we have understood it for the past century, does take into account issues that go
beyond the substantive outcome of a case. The fact that these theories have been advanced in response
to the "paradox" does not mean that their viability is contingent upon the existence of the "paradox."
Although the non-instrumental approach might prove unnecessary to respond to the "paradox," it is,
indeed, necessary to a full understanding of the values that due process protects.
116. Mashaw, supra note 3, at 899.
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procedures for its achievement. As we have already shown, attainment of
the instrumental value demands use of a truly independent adjudicator.
Therefore, logically the same must be true for the so-called "non-
instrumental" values. In any event, we will show that, wholly apart from
their link to the accuracy concern, none of the so-called "non-
instrumental" values can be accomplished without the participation of an
independent adjudicator.
1. The Appearance of Fairness
The goal of fostering an appearance of fairness represents the flip side
of the accuracy value embodied in the instrumental approach. The instru-
mental approach views accuracy as the ultimate goal, and defines the
value objectively. The goal is to apply efficiently a broad legislative choice
to specific factual contexts, and the test of a procedure's utility is its capac-
ity to implement that legislative criteria with observable success.
But not all deviations can be observed, and given two untested proce-
dural models, the accuracy value cannot mandate that one be utilized in-
stead of the other. At this point, the value of appearance-of-fairness be-
comes relevant. It requires that even if a given procedure does not clearly
advance the goal of accuracy, it is nonetheless worthwhile insofar as it
"generate[s] the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice
has been done.1
1 1 7
Of all the values informing the due process guarantee, the perception-
of-fairness value most clearly dictates use of a truly independent adjudica-
tor. Whether or not it can be proven that a particular decisionmaker al-
lows her personal interests to sway her resolution of a dispute, the percep-
tion-of-fairness value demands that she be enjoined from deciding the case
if she has some identifiable potential bias. Few situations more severely
threaten trust in the judicial process than the perception that a litigant
never had a chance because the decisionmaker may have owed the other
side special favors.
The Supreme Court has forcefully recognized this truth. Describing its
prophylactic rules regarding disqualification of judges, the Court ex-
plained that "[s]uch a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges
who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the
scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its
high function in the best way, justice must satisfy the appearance of jus-
tice.'" 11 8 There can be little question that use of a truly independent adju-
117. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frank-
furter J., concurring).
118. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11,
14 (1954)) (emphasis added).
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dicator is essential to attainment of this goal. Indeed, if there exists any
reasonable doubt about the adjudicator's impartiality at the outset of a
case, provision of the most elaborate procedural safeguards will not avail
to create this appearance of justice.
2. Equality
One value that might conceivably be fostered by procedural due process
is the goal of equality. According to Mashaw, the equality value demands
that "the techniques for making collective decisions not imply that one
person's or group's contribution (facts, interpretation, policy argument,
etc.) is entitled to greater respect than another's merely because of the
identity of the person or group." ' 9 To a certain extent, the goal of equal-
ity is uncontroversial, though at most its attainment amounts to a neces-
sary, not a sufficient, condition for the realization of due process.1 20 Per-
haps most important, it is evident that the equality principle represents no
values independent of those embodied in the instrumental approach.
Professor Summers claims that the question of procedural fairness, or
equality, is wholly separate from the question of who wins or loses. As he
explains, "an adjudicator might choose to hear only one side via both oral
and written briefs, but the other side via only written briefs ...
Whether the advantaged party wins or loses, the procedure itself is unfair,
for the adjudicator does not accord equal procedural rights to parties simi-
larly situated in relevant respects."1'' But why are the parties, or society
for that matter, concerned about this bias if not because it might alter the
outcome of the case? It is probably true that even an inequality in proce-
dure that does not relate to the outcome of the case could be deemed an
affront to dignitary values. For example, there can be little doubt that a
procedural rule allowing the friends and relatives of a white litigant to sit
near the front of the courtroom while requiring those of a black litigant to
sit in the back would violate the equality principle, even though it is diffi-
cult to see how such an inequality could have a substantial impact on the
case's outcome. But to the extent that such inequality is unrelated to the
case's outcome, it would seem to be a part of a broader concern for equal-
ity that pervades all rules governing the lives of individuals. Thus, the
fact that equality in this sense also reaches judicial and administrative
119. Mashaw, supra note 3, at 899.
120. As Mashaw recognizes, equality is a thin protection for due process, even on a theoretical
level. "If we provided everyone confronting any administrative decision with the process made availa-
ble to K in The Trial, equality would be maintained, but the protection afforded individual self-
respect would be modest indeed." Id. at 901 (footnote omitted).
121. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for Process Values, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 25 (1974).
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procedures does not make it a unique aspect of procedural due process. To
the extent that equality is integrally bound up with procedural due pro-
cess, it would seem to be part of a broader concern for reaching an accu-
rate result. If procedures are employed that unfairly or irrationally give
an advantage to one side over the other,122 the danger arises that the ulti-
mate finding will also be unfairly influenced.
Viewed in this light, there can be no doubt that the goal of procedural
equality requires the use of a truly independent adjudicator. Indeed, use
of a non-independent adjudicator represents the essence of procedural ine-
quality: even if the parties are equally afforded every other procedural
protection, the most rudimentary equality cannot be achieved if the adju-
dicator is subject to irrational factors that skew her decisionmaking to-
wards one of the litigants.
3. Predictability, Transparency and Rationality
The values of predictability, transparency and rationality all relate to
the "participants' ability to engage in rational planning about their situa-
tion, to make informed choices among options."12 This value, which
Summers calls "procedural rationality,1' 24 constitutes part of the essential
groundwork of a successful legal system. As Lon Fuller has stated,
"[c]ertainly there can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can
have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept
secret from him." 12 5 Although revelation of legal rules usually arises from
statutory sources or prior judicial decisions, revelation of the reason for
government action in a particular case frequently requires some individu-
alized process of explanation.
But is this value separable from "good result efficacy" ?126 Summers
argues that "of two legal processes yielding more or less the same results,
only one of which is a rational process, we should generally prefer the
rational one."127 But is not the reason that we prefer the rational process
because in the long-run we estimate that it will indeed achieve better re-
sults? Indeed, perhaps the decisionmaking process is rational or irrational
122. It is, of course, conceivable that a particular procedure will seem to provide an advantage to
one litigant over another, yet still not violate the equality principle. This is because, in certain in-
stances, provision of an advantage to one litigant is rationally dictated by external considerations. For
example, one party will bear a burden of production or persuasion not borne by the other party. In
this instance, whatever inequality that exists between litigants is dictated by rational considerations.
Similarly, some apparent inequalities might be justified inasmuch as they represent legitimate efforts
to reverse already existing procedural advantages. See Mashaw, supra note 3, at 900-01.
123. Mashaw, supra note 3, at 901.
124. Summers, supra note 121, at 26.
125. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, 39 (Rev. ed. 1969).
126. Summers, supra note 121, at 26.
127. Id.
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precisely according to its efficacy in achieving good results. Accuracy-a
wholly instrumental value-may indeed be the defining characteristic of
rationality.
More fundamentally, it is dangerous to create an illusion of predictabil-
ity when the decision was in fact reached on the basis of irrational factors.
As Mashaw explains, "[i]n the end, there must also be some guarantee,
usually by articulation of the basis for the decision, that the issues, evi-
dence, and processes were in fact meaningful to the outcome.' '128 Without
this assurance, the appearance of procedural fairness is a sham causing
more harm than good. The deprived individual may be lulled into believ-
ing that he has contributed to the decisionmaking that so importantly af-
fects him. His inaccurately positive perception of reality is likely to dimin-
ish his motivation to bring about the type of political change that would
afford him real benefit-i.e., a substantive entitlement." 9
When an adjudicator injects irrelevant factors into the decisionmaking
process because she is biased, the values of predictability, transparency
and rationality are vitiated. Individuals cannot accurately plan their ac-
tions, for the decisionmaker has abandoned the course shaped by the law
in her reliance on illegitimate considerations. Without a sufficiently inde-
pendent adjudicator, therefore, these values cannot be protected. By con-
trast, the elimination of some other procedures would not automatically
threaten the achievement of these values. As long as the procedural rules
are set out in advance, in certain cases these values can still be fulfilled
without the rights to oral presentation, cross-examination and the like.
128. Mashaw, supra note 3, at 901 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
129. Indeed, it has been suggested that the entire substance/procedure dichotomy can be ex-
plained in terms of political and administrative goals. See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and
Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1258-63 (1982). By forcing a state to announce its decision
in substantive rather than procedural terms, the court ensures that the citizenry is aware of the real
nature of state action. The theory is of course based on the proposition that the public is more aware
of a legislature's decisions on substantive matters than on procedural matters. Easterbrook argues
that it is not true "that procedural rules are less visible [insofar as] there are lots of poorly perceived
substantive rules." Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 111; see also Allen, The Restoration of In Re Win-
ship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson v. New York, 76
MicH. L. REv. 30, 44 n.60 (1977) (no documentation that there is ". . . significant differential in
the public's understanding of substantive and procedural rules") (emphasis in original). It seems be-
yond doubt, however, that the media and the public are typically far less involved in procedural
minutae than they are in substantive issues. It is not generally understood that a tiny procedural
nuance can have a huge effect on the question of who is entitled to a given benefit. See Underwood,
The Thumb on the Scales ofJustice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299,
1323-25 (1977) (discussing "truth-in-labeling" function to remedy public's misunderstanding of pro-
cedural rules).
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4. Participation
The value of participation in the decisionmaking process appears on the
list of virtually every author who discusses nonformal approaches to due
process.1 3° Michelman explains that:
the individual may have various reasons for wanting the opportunity
to discuss the decision with the agent. Some pertain to external con-
sequences: the individual might succeed in persuading the agent
away from the harmful action. But again a participatory opportunity
may also be psychologically important to the individual: to have
played a part in, to have made one's apt contribution to decisions
which are about oneself may be counted important even though the
decision, as it turns out, is the most unfavorable one imaginable and
one's efforts have not proved influential."' 1
Aside from this individual psychological benefit, Michelman also describes
a societal benefit derived from participation. Affording an individual an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings, he posits, counters the per-
ception of an atmosphere in which public officials act silently or secre-
tively, without interchange with those whom their actions affect." 2
The two values that Michelman sees in nonformal procedures, revela-
tion and participation, are mirror images of each other. Under the revela-
tion value, the participant is a passive listener trying to digest as much
information as possible. By contrast, in his participatory role, the individ-
ual attempts to communicate his feelings to the opposing party and to the
decisionmaker. This participation only makes sense, though, if the indi-
vidual harbors some hope of bringing about substantive change in the
state agent's action or attitude. Of course, the change in attitude might
affect only future cases, not this participant's situation, but nonetheless the
focus remains results-oriented. We value participation because we believe
that it can bring about a different outcome. Even as Michelman defines it,
participation means "full and frank interchange," 33 and thus focuses on
the litigant's opportunity to inform the agent in the hopes of changing her
decision.
The connection that many have drawn between "control" and "partici-
pation" demonstrates the inseparable connection between participation
130. In fact, the Supreme Court has characterized the "two central concerns of procedural due
process" as "the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation
and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process." Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446
U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
131. Michelman, supra note 3, at 127.
132. Id. at 128.
133. Id.
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and result efficacy.134 Imagine a situation in which the state agent an-
nounces that his mind is absolutely made up and that he will not recon-
sider his decision. Does participation at that stage afford any opportunity
for "control" over one's own destiny? Would there be any benefit to al-
lowing participation after a decision has been implemented irrevocably?
There may be something to be said for allowing an individual to "vent"
his feelings through access to his decisionmaker even then. But there are
myriads of other, more politically effective, ways of releasing steam, and it
is hard to believe that the Constitution mandates a confrontation for frus-
tration's sake alone. More important, the deprived individual may be una-
ware that he is merely letting off steam. He is again being misled into
believing that he has a participatory role, when in reality he does not.
We can say, then, that the participation value recognizes an individual's
interest in confronting the decisionmaker in order to attempt to persuade
her to rule in his favor, or alternatively, simply to gain the psychological
satisfaction of having had some input into the decision. As far as the first
interest goes, it is obvious that the ability to persuade presupposes a per-
suadable decisionmaker. Though it cannot be said that there is absolutely
no chance of persuading a decisionmaker who has some predispositions or
biases, it is certainly far less likely. A system that holds itself out as pro-
moting this value cannot tolerate the input of a decisionmaker whose pres-
ence so dilutes the possibility of meaningful participation. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that the "requirement of neutrality in
adjudicative proceedings safeguards ... the promotion of participation
and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process.
13 5
The second aspect of the participation value recognizes the individual's
psychological interest in getting his point of view across to the deci-
sionmaker, even if there is absolutely no chance of changing the deci-
sionmaker's mind. Though it is debatable whether this "steamletting"
function really amounts to a due process requirement, the participation of
an independent decisionmaker can substantially further the goals of such a
function. For example, when a non-tenured professor is fired, fulfillment
of the participation value requires that even though the dean's decision is
final, the professor still has some interest in getting his point of view
across. Toward this end, a number of scholars have suggested that due
process requires the opportunity for an informal personal encounter be-
tween the two.1"" But what possible assurances are there that the dean
will do anything more than give the professor the chance to scream while
134. See, e.g., Saphire, supra note 3, at 160-63.
135. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
136. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 3; Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Ad-
ministrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 60, 78 (1976).
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the dean pays absolutely no attention? If it is important to ensure that the
professor have the opportunity to communicate with the dean, and not just
talk to, or at him, then some independent monitor is needed to take the
steps necessary to ensure that the dean pays attention.137 The independent
figure could impose procedures that guarantee at least a minimal amount
of meaningful communication between the participants. 38
5. Revelation
The value of revelation seems to be truly unrelated either to the out-
come of the case or to any hope of changing that outcome. As explained
by Michelman:
The individual may have various reasons for wanting to be told why,
even if he makes no claim to legal protection, and even if no further
participation is allowed him. Some of those reasons may pertain to
external consequences: the individual may wish to make political use
of the information, or use it to help him ward off harm to his repu-
tation. Yet the information may also be wanted for introspective rea-
sons-because, for example, it fills a potentially destructive gap in
the individual's conception of himself. 3
All three of these potential uses of information concerning decisions gov-
erning liberty and property interests are distinct from any effort to alter
the outcome of the case. Nonetheless, Michelman arguably misses the
most crucial contribution of revelation-affording the individual and
others the opportunity to base their future behavior on more complete
information. For example, a professor might take a job with a university
confident that, though he has no legal entitlement, the dean will deal hu-
manely with him. If he is later told upon termination that he was fired for
no reason, then he and others will use this information when considering
whether to accept non-tenured positions in the future-both with this par-
ticular dean and in general.
But the fact that the goal of the revelation value is separate from that of
the more formal values does not mean that attainment of that goal consti-
tutes a sufficient condition for the preservation of the "dignitary" interests
137. It has been proposed that a litigant might be allowed to insist that he be given an opportu-
nity for oral presentation "so that the arguer will have some small assurance that his views have
reached the decider's ears if not his mind." W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW: CASES AND CoMMErS 814 (7th ed. 1979).
138. These procedures might include a requirement that the decider make a point-by-point report
of her position on each of the issues raised by the litigant. Such a requirement is already in place for
formal adjudication and rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)
(1982).
139. Michelman, supra note 3, at 127.
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thought to be served by procedural due process. An official's revelation
that he has acted arbitrarily in dealing with an individual, though perhaps
helpful in certain senses to the individual, does not, in and of itself, treat
that individual with dignity. As long as the individual can do nothing to
alter the outcome, the revelation does not alter the morally unacceptable
fact of arbitrary governmental treatment.
Moreover, it is by no means clear that the methods generally deemed
necessary to attain the revelation value are likely to bring about the
sought-after result. Unlike those nonformal values that share procedures
with the formal approach, the revelation value, according to commenta-
tors, requires a direct, non-coerced meeting between the agent and the
individual at which the individual would receive a basic explanation about
the nature of the decision taken or to be taken. Yet a superior is unlikely
to tell his fired employee that he was fired for "no reason," even if that
were the case. Rather, the employer may focus upon some aspect of the
worker's character or work performance and attribute the termination to
that. Alternatively, there may be a real reason for the termination which
the employer feels uncomfortable telling the employee. Therefore the em-
ployer may invent some other reason or attribute the firing to his own
arbitrariness. In either case the employee has not benefited by the revela-
tion. He and other interested people are perhaps better off acting in the
future on the basis of their own assessments of what happened, rather
than upon the false or ambiguous reasons given by the employer.
Michael Perry recognizes that a revelation entitlement is a tenuous one.
But, he argues, "except with respect to officials acting in bad faith-and
there is no reason to assume that most do-a requirement to give a fair
explanation could be expected to have some effect."14 It is true that most
officials do not act in bad faith. But legal rules are made with the bad
official-not the good one-in mind. The good supervisor would take his
employee aside and provide an explanation for his firing, whether or not
it was constitutionally required. But in shaping the behavior of supervi-
sors who would not otherwise provide explanations, it is not at all clear
that those officials will always, or even often, be truthful in their
revelations.
Further, although the revelation principle does represent values distinct
from those explicitly recognized in the traditional, instrumentalist ap-
proach, its costs are high. Those costs do not relate only to the fiscal bur-
den that the new procedures would place on government agencies. If those
were the only costs, they would have to bow before any serious due pro-
140. Perry, Constitutional "Fairness": Notes on Equal Protection and Due Process, 63 VA. L.
REV. 383, 428 (1977).
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cess claim."" Rather, the costs involve the dilution of the due process
guarantee.
The informal interchange required by the revelation value would be
undermined by the intrusion of a neutral, third party adjudicator.1 42
However, the problem with such an informal approach, as we have
shown, is that it does not guarantee accurate revelation. The participation
of an independent figure, on the other hand, can ensure some degree of
accuracy. For example, the independent figure could require the produc-
tion of particular evidence that would ensure, to a much greater degree,
accurate revelation. Absent such control, the revelation principle threatens
to serve not as a supplement to the accuracy goal of due process, but as a
replacement for it. It is therefore apparent that even the paradigmatic
non-instrumental value requires the participation of an authoritative, in-
dependent figure for its realization.
6. Privacy-Dignity
There is strong support in the Supreme Court's decisions for the pro-
position that the government violates due process when it invades individ-
uals' dignitary rights through physical or mental intrusion.143 The line of
cases condemning coerced confessions exemplifies this principle. But this
concern for individual autonomy is not relevant to the discussion here.
Unlike other nonformal values that call for added procedures, the privacy
value only restricts the way in which procedures can be carried out. It is a
negative, rather than a positive, mandate, which has no impact on the
types of procedures necessary to justify a deprivation of due process or on
what procedures best serve that value.
V. DEFINING ADJUDICATORY INDEPENDENCE
Examination and application of the due process values-both instru-
mental and non-instrumental-demonstrate that none can be realized
without the participation of an independent adjudicator. Though the par-
ticipation and revelation values should not be treated as part of the core of
due process, even their vitality depends upon the participation of some
independent person. "Independence," however, is a vague and relative
term. The requirement of an "independent adjudicator," when described
abstractly, seems relatively uncontroversial. The greatest difficulties arise
in determining what degree of independence will satisfy the due process
requirement.
141. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
142. Saphire, supra note 3, at 165 n.239.
143. See discussion at supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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A. The Scope of the Problem
It is useful to divide the situations that threaten the independence of the
adjudicator into three categories of partiality.""' First, the decisionmaker
may have a financial stake in the outcome of the case. Second, the deci-
sionmaker may have some personal bias toward a party in the case. Fi-
nally, the decisionmaker may be predisposed toward a certain position
that a party maintains in the case. These categories of bias differ mainly
in degree, not in kind. Each of these predispositions is potentially threat-
ening, and it would be difficult to measure just how much temptation
there exists in each instance. Indeed, in the best of all possible worlds,
even the slightest possibility of bias would be sufficient to disqualify a
judge from hearing a case. But under such a scheme there would probably
be no one left to adjudicate anything. Reality forces us to tolerate some
bias. The degree of bias that we are willing to tolerate should be limited,
however, by our ability to avoid it. If, in a given circumstance, it is not
extremely burdensome to remove potential bias, the fact that the bias is
relatively slight should not justify the failure to avoid it.
The idea of tolerating potential biases out of necessity is not a new one.
Indeed, it can be traced back over five and a half centuries.
14 The Su-
preme Court's most recent affirmation of the necessity doctrine came in
United States v. Will. 4 In that case, the Court had to decide whether
Congress could constitutionally reduce previously authorized cost of living
increases for article III judges. Any decision would directly and substan-
tially affect the finances of every federal judge, and the Court had long
held that financial interest represents the strongest type of temptation to
an adjudicator. The Court nonetheless held that it was not disqualified,
reasoning that "although a judge had better not, if it can be avoided, take
part in the decision of a case in which he has any personal interest, yet he
not only may but must do so if the case cannot be heard otherwise."
1 47
In a sense, of course, use of the term "necessity" in this context is disin-
genuous. Rarely, if ever, would it be truly impossible to provide indepen-
dence. In Will, for example, reliance on article III judges could have been
circumvented by relying exclusively upon the state judiciaries, whose
judges are not predisposed to either side of the case and who are fully
competent and obligated to adjudicate issues of federal constitutional
144. This categorization is roughly based on Professor Davis's description of five kinds of bias. K.
DAvis, supra note 93, § 19:1, at 713.
145. In United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), the Court traced the origin of the necessity
rule to the Chancellor of Oxford in 1430. The Court pointed out that many early cases "confirmed
the vitality of the Rule" in this country as well. Id. at 213-14.
146. 449 U.S. 200.
147. Id. at 213 (quoting F. POLLACK, A FIRsT BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 270 (6th ed. 1929)).
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law.1 48 However, the opportunity for a uniform, dispositive judicial reso-
lution of this delicate constitutional issue-a resolution that could come
only from the United States Supreme Court, itself composed of article III
judges-would have been lost through such a means. Each of the fifty
state court decisions on the issue would have constituted a binding con-
struction of federal constitutional law. Federal judges in some states would
benefit from a finding of the unconstitutionality of the challenged congres-
sional action, while those in other states would not receive such protection.
Such inconsistency in interpretation on so important and difficult an issue
of constitutional law is perhaps best avoided. However, it would be incor-
rect to characterize Supreme Court resolution of the matter as "neces-
sary." Although the potential for interstate inconsistency on the question
is certainly to be deplored, it would surely be an exaggeration to view it as
an "impossible" result. Use of the term "necessity" tends to convey a mis-
leading sense of inescapability that disguises the delicate analytical process
that is actually conducted.
Under our analysis, a particular procedure essential to the attainment
of the values served by procedural due process can be discarded only upon
the showing of a truly compelling government interest.1 49 Moreover, we
frankly acknowledge, as the Mathews test did not, that the denial of a
procedure does not satisfy the demands of due process, but instead consti-
tutes one of the exceptional situations in which the constitutional protec-
tion must yield to the competing interest. In Will, unlike all of the other
cases in which the issue of judicial independence rises to the level of due
process, the potential for undue influence is actually in favor of the indi-
vidual litigant, rather than the government. The Justices' possible bias in
the case favored the federal judges who were challenging the congressional
action, because their own financial interests would have been directly im-
proved by a finding in favor of the judges. Although as a general matter
any judicial bias should be avoided, the purpose of the due process
clause-and indeed, of the entire Bill of Rights-is to protect the individ-
ual against the government. Arguably, then, the potential for judicial bias
in Will does not even implicate the due process clause, because it nega-
tively affects only the government. At the very least, the concern for judi-
cial independence is so diluted in such a situation that it is overcome with
relative ease by the competing need for a dispositive, unifying Supreme
Court decision on an important and unsettled constitutional issue.
In other cases, the problem of cataloging the factors that should be
deemed sufficiently compelling to override the interest in having an inde-
148. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (state courts have duty to adjudicate claims arising
under federal law).
149. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
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pendent adjudicator is more complex. One possible method of resolving
the question focuses not on the nature of the competing interest, but on
the definition of "independence." In other words, we might simply define
the term in such a manner that, as a practical matter, it would avoid most
conflicts with competing interests. For example, we might exclude from
the prohibited category cases in which there exists merely the potential for
an improperly influenced decision, confining it to those cases in which it
can be demonstrated that the adjudicator's decison was in fact influenced
by improper factors. As so defined, the concept of independence would
only rarely conflict with other interests, because it would only rarely be
found to be absent.
Such a definition must be rejected, however, both because it insuffi-
ciently protects the values served by procedural due process and because it
is unrealistic and impossible to apply. It is extremely difficult to marshall
objective evidence that an adjudicator's decison was, in fact, the product of
improper influence. In many instances the pressures on an adjudicator
may be so subtle that not even she is aware that her decison has been
shaped by improper influences. Thus, if it is to be at all meaningful, the
concept of adjudicatory independence must be interpreted to require at
least some prophylactic protections against improper external influence.
In the following sections, we will examine three different issues: (1) the
types of external influences that may threaten an adjudicator's indepen-
dence; (2) the degree to which prophylactic protections of independence
should be required by the due process clause; and (3) the circumstances, if
any, in which the due process requirement of prophylactically protected
independence may be overcome by compelling government interests. A
resolution of these issues will indicate the degree to which prophylactic
protections must extend in order reasonably to assure adjudicatory
independence.
B. Threats to Adjudicatory Independence: Delimiting the Scope of the
Prophylactic Guarantees
1. Direct Financial Interest
The decisionmaker who has a direct financial interest in the outcome of
a case presents perhaps the clearest instance of partiality. As early as
1610, at the time of Dr. Bonham's Case,150 the proposition that no man
can judge a case in which he has a financial interest was firmly estab-
lished. Since that time, courts and legislatures, including the United States
Supreme Court, have repeatedly held that "officers acting in a judicial or
150. 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 8 Coke 114a (C.P. 1610).
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quasi-judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy
to be decided." '51 But at the same time that it so held, the Court cautioned
that "[n]ice questions . . often arise as to what the degree or nature of
the interest must be.3
1 52
In Tumey v. Ohio, 53 the Supreme Court's first decision on judicial im-
partiality, Tumey had been convicted of unlawful possession of intoxicat-
ing liquor by Mayor Pugh of North College Hill, Ohio. Under the Ohio
statute, one half of whatever fine was imposed went to the State and the
other half went to the township, municipality, or county that prosecuted
the case. North College Hill had, in turn, passed an ordinance providing
that, in the case of a conviction, the Mayor would receive his costs in each
case from the village's share. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that
the scheme violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.15' Importantly, the Court's holding was not based on a finding that
the Judge-Mayor was in fact partial. There was no evidence to indicate
that he had actually taken his financial interests into consideration in de-
ciding the cases. Nor was there any evidence that might have implicated
him circumstantially. The Court seemed to recognize that actual influence
could rarely be proven. The Court was thus willing to create a prophylac-
tic rule of law disqualifyng judges when the objective circumstances in-
creased the likelihood of actual influence. The Court's decision, however,
also regarded potential financial influence as an evil in itself. The percep-
tion of unfairness that a financial interest creates was a factor in the
Court's analysis.1 55
The legal standard in Tumey-"possible temptation to the average man
as a judge"-has not been seriously disputed. There has, however, been
considerable debate as to how much and how direct a financial interest
must be to create the "possible temptation." The Court has required
neither analysis of the judge's financial position nor inquiry into the effect
of a particular biasing factor on the judge's frame of mind. In light of the
severe practical barriers to conducting such analyses and the substantial
dangers to judicial independence that derive from such financial pres-
151. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927); see also Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57, 60 (1972).
152. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 522.
153. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
154. The Court held that paying a judge for his services only when he convicts cannot be regardedas due process of law, "unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they may be properly
ignored as within the maxim de minimis non curat lex [the law does not care for trifling matters]."
Id. at 531. Under our model, of course, even such minimal payments are intolerable if they are
avoidable. Indeed, the Court seems to have come to this conclusion as well. See Commonwealth Coat-
ings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) ("Nor should it be at all relevant
.'Itihat the payments received were a Very small part of [the arbitrator's] income."').
155. 273 U.S. at 533. The Court was explicit regarding its pursuit of the appearance of justice in
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
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sures,1 5 6 it seems reasonable to conclude that any financial temptation,
regardless of how indirect or insubstantial, presents a possibility of
temptation.
This conclusion has considerable relevance for the current appointment
practices that pervade state judiciaries. Unlike article III federal judges,
most state court judges do not enjoy salary and tenure 
protection. 157
Rather, they are appointed or elected for fixed terms, and are subject to
legislative control. At the close of the term, the judge must stand for re-
appointment or re-election. Yet such judges are often called upon to decide
cases involving the very person who holds the appointment
power-typically the Governor 1 5-or to rule in cases involving a consti-
tutional challenge to legislation enacted by a body that could lower judi-
cial salaries. In the case of election, the role of party politics makes this
problem equally severe because the judge is usually dependent on the
party for an endorsement.159 Although the level of undue influence may
be less than in a case like Tumey in which the judge stands to gain or lose
financially as a direct result of her decision in each case, this situation
offers "possible temptation to the average man acting as a judge . . .
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice and clear" between the
parties to the suit.
Thus, if no costs were incurred as a result, the due process guarantee
would seem to require constitutional protections of state judicial salaries
and tenure to remove possible bias in those cases in which a liberty or
property interest is asserted and the state or a state agency is a party to
the case. As the framers of article III apparently assumed, absent such
156. At a minimum it is unlikely that there can be any real proof of the role of subconscious
motivation in any decisionmaker's thought process. In Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), how-
ever, the Court seemed to demand such proof when it stated that, in order to overcome a presumption
of honesty and integrity of administrative officials, a party must "convince the court that, under 
a
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness[es]" a combination of investigatory
with adjudicative functions poses an undue risk of partiality. Id. at 47. The error in the Court's
analysis is its preoccupation with the presumption of integrity. One need not doubt the integrity or
honesty of an official to argue that it is inevitable that personal factors will, perhaps subconsciously,
enter his mind.
157. Only Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island afford life tenure to all their
judges. New Jersey affords life tenure to judges only after they have been reappointed from their first
set term. See L. BERKSON, S. B.ELLER & M. GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS 277 (American Judicature Society 1981).
158. In states that elect judges, the problem is a bit more subtle, but nonetheless real. First, in
many elections, the support of the party leaders is essential. Second, when there is a clear consensus
among the electorate as to a desired outcome, the pressure on a judge to decide the case that way is
just as extreme, and just as illegitimate, as when the pressure emanates from a single political figure.
159. Of the 47 states without life tenure, 9 hold partisan elections for all judgeships (first or
subsequent term), 13 hold non-partisan elections, 16 have judicial retention elections where the judge
runs unopposed but must receive a specified percentage of the vote, and 9 have provisions for reap-
pointment. L. BERKSON, S. BFLFast & M. GRIMALDI, supra note 157.
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prophylactic protections, there is no way to assure the necessary judicial
independence.
The problem, of course, is that recognition of a due process right to
state judiciaries with salary and tenure protections would dictate a sub-
stantial restructuring of the judicial organization in most states, 60 result-
ing in significant new burdens and costs to the states. Thus, the problem
of ensuring the independence of state courts squarely presents the question
of when these additional costs outweigh the need for prophylactic protec-
tions of adjudicatory independence.
Yet balancing of increased administrative costs against the need for ad-
judicatory independence is a dangerous practice. The goal of procedural
fairness necessarily implies an imposition of financial costs and adminis-
trative burdens that would not otherwise exist absent the due process re-
quirement. Frequent reliance upon this factor to overcome the need for a
procedural protections might well consume the entire concept of due pro-
cess. Further, as noted above, in weighing immediately recognizable costs
against benefits which, though of substantial importance in the long run,
may be more difficult to recognize, this balancing inevitably favors the
government. 61
Thus, arguably an increase in financial cost and administrative burden
should never overcome the need for even broad prophylactic protections of
adjudicatory independence. In any event, that the financial costs imposed
by insulation of judicial salary and tenure are not prohibitive is evidenced
by the fact that article III of the United States Constitution has imposed
similar costs on the federal government for almost two hundred years.
Providing salary and tenure protection to all state judges, however,
might be thought to carry with it huge non-financial costs, for states
would no longer be able to insure judicial competence through the politi-
cal process. However, because the problem of bias is strongest when the
state itself is a party, it would not be necessary for the states to provide
salary and tenure protection to every state judge to avoid the problem of
undue bias. 16 2 Rather, a select group of proven judges could be appointed
to the court that would hear this category of cases.16 8 Finally, the federal
160. Presumably, this constitutional requirement would not apply to cases in which the state was
not a party, or in which no liberty or property interest was asserted.
161. See discussion supra at note 83.
162. In the typical case between private litigants affecting private rights, there is likely to be nopressure upon the judge to rule in a certain way for political reasons. But there are a number of cases,such as private civil rights actions or antitrust actions, where political pressure might be applied, orwhere the judge might at least know how the people in charge would like him to rule. For this reason,the preferred system would include salary and tenure protection for all state judges. The alternative
suggested in the text should not come into play unless the state can show a significant need for
maintaining direct oversight over a group of judges.
163. New Jersey's system of providing life tenure for judges who are reappointed after a first
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Constitution would seem to settle the question of which inter-
est-independence or accountability-should be constitutionally fostered
within the judicial branch. There is no evidence that the state courts differ
from the federal tribunals in a way that modifies the balance that the
framers achieved for the federal system."
4 Thus, in cases involving the
assertion of a liberty or property interest in which the state is a party, the
use of non-tenured state judges seems to be a clear violation of procedural
due process. The potential for bias can be removed without unacceptable
costs.
Federal judges may also feel pressure to decide certain cases for reasons
of self-interest. A district court judge with aspirations for an appointment
to the court of appeals may be tempted to please the President with his
decisions." 5 This same problem occurs when a number of court of appeals
judges are considered candidates for an appointment to the Supreme
Court. This problem is most severe when a case involves heated political
issues or claims against the President himself. There is potential for bias
in this situation, but this case differs from the state judge context because
it is not possible to change this state of affairs without incurring huge
institutional costs. The only remedy would be to disqualify all judges from
elevation within the judiciary, or, for that matter, from appointment to
any other branch of government. Such a system would deprive the higher
courts of many able lower court judges, currently the largest pool for
higher judicial appointments. Moreover, few people would be willing to
accept a lower court appointment knowing that it would effectively lock
term of set years is an example of the type of program that could be implemented. See supra note 157.
164. It should be emphasized that we do not argue that Article III applies of its own force to the
states. Rather, we contend that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause should today be con-
strued to incorporate by reference the standards of judicial independence imposed by Article III upon
the federal judiciary.
165. See Macey, Conservative Judgment Time, Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 1985, at 14, col. 4:
Everyone knows that for you to get a promotion, the boss must be happy with your work.
This appears to hold true in the process that will decide who will fill the next U.S. Supreme
Court vacancy. Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia are the
four federal appeals court judges most widely perceived to be in contention. In their recent
opinions and scholarly writings, each of these men is now sending President Reagan subtle but
unmistakable signals, through slight changes in philosophy, that he is the man for the job.
But see L'Acovara, A Talk with Judge Robert H. Bork, DIsmsTc LAWYER, May/June 1985, at 33,
where Judge Bork stated:
I don't know of anybody who has written anything differently or decided differently because
of [the screening process for Supreme court appointments].. . . Obviously when you're consid-
ering . . . a judicial appointment, you would like to know what that man or woman thinks,
you look for a track record, and that means that you read any articles they've written, any
opinions they've written. That part of the selection process is inevitable, and there's no reason
to be upset about it.
The promotion problem has received some attention as it applies to the Administrative Law Judge
system. Attorney General Katzenbach recognized that the "carrot of [a promotion] could be used to
exert a subtle influence on the examiner to decide as the agency wishes. . . . Congress recognized
that such possibilities can never be wholly eliminated. . . ." 42 Op. Att'y Gen. 289, 299 (1964).
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them into that position forever. Thus, in the case of federal judges the
potential for undue influence should probably be tolerated, though this
conclusion is by no means free from doubt.
One final example of a situation in which financial self-interest may
tempt the adjudicator is decisionmaking by an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). ALJs occupy their positions for an unlimited number of years and
are removable for cause."' 6 That tenure is unlimited in years alleviates the
problem faced by many state judges, but the "for-cause" removal provi-
sion constitutes an even greater invasion of independence.
Evidence suggests that various agencies have used the possibility of re-
moval as a tool for coercing decisions that are consistent with the agency's
wishes.16 7 Through its authority to "review" an ALJ's competence and
work habits, the agency can quite directly make its irritation known to a
judge and his colleagues. As in the case of the state judiciaries, however, a
system so replete with potential encroachments on adjudicatory indepen-
dence could be rectified with a minimum of cost. Through the provision of
salary and tenure protections, this entire problem can be eradicated: ALJs
would then be shielded from such pressures in much the same way that
article III judges are. A statutory impeachment practice, similar to that
established by the Constitution for federal judges, could be established to
deal with the truly derelict administrative judge. Such a mechanism safe-
guards both the due process guarantee and the adherence to separation of
powers principles.
Of course, the decisions of administrative law judges are subject to some
degree of judicial review.16 8 It might therefore be argued that the due
process requirement of adjudicatory independence could be satisfied at the
166.
An action may be taken against an administrative law judge appointed under section 3105 of
this title by the agency in which the administrative law judge is employed only for good cause
established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after oppor-
tunity for hearing before the Board.
5 U.S.c. § 7521(a) (1982).
167. See generally Rosenblum, Contexts and Contents of "For Good Cause" as Criterion for
Removal of Administrative Law Judges: Legal and Policy Factors, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 593
(1984). In recent years there have been a multitude of cases filed by Administrative Law Judges
challenging the pressures that various agencies-typically the Social Security Administration--exert
upon them. See, e.g., Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980) (allegation that Health and
Human Services officials used delay-avoidance procedures to interfere with decisional independence of
ALJs); Association of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984) (challenging
Health and Human Services Department's program of performance appraisal of ALJs). Notwith-
standing this development, some courts continue to express satisfaction with the level of independence
that ALJs enjoy. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981) (en
banc) (ALJ need only provide list of factors giving rise to recommendation that bargaining order be
issued, and is not required to state each inference drawn from these factors), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
940 (1982); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-14 (1978) (discussing safeguards ensuring
independence of hearing examiners).
168. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982).
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appellate stage. But the scope of judicial review at that stage-particularly
in regard to factual findings-is so limited.. 9 as to provide dubious assur-
ance that an individual has received a truly meaningful hearing before an
independent adjudicator. If federal judicial review took the form of a com-
plete de novo examination of both facts and law, due process arguably
would be satisfied, even if the ALJ lacked the requisite independence. We
need not seriously consider that question, however, because the burden
such a practice would place on the federal judiciary would, as a practical
matter, be prohibitive.Y1 Providing the ALJ's with the requisite protec-




In Tumey the Supreme Court distinguished financial interests from
other types of potential bias. As the Court announced, "[a]ll questions of
judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus, mat-
ters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would
seem to be matters merely of legislative discretion.
17 2 The Court did not
explain why a "possibility" of a judge being swayed by financial self-
interest is a constitutional matter, while the fact that a judge harbors ei-
ther a personal prejudice against or a predisposition toward a litigant is
not. Yet this unjustified proposition has to a certain extent survived. The
Court has been extremely reluctant to disqualify a judge when no direct
financial interest is involved, finding a due process violation only in cases
169. It has long been recognized that the impartiality of the judges hearing an appeal does not
cure the due process problems created by a biased adjudicator at the trial level. See Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) (rejecting argument that de novo trial is cure and explaining
that litigant is entitled to "neutral and detached judge in the first instance").
In North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976), the Court limited the holding of Ward to cases involving
bias and held that trial de novo does cure any difficulties created by a trial before a nonlawyer police
court. Two differences might justify this limitation of Ward. First, although a trial before a nonlaw-
yer-judge can create feelings of frustration in the parties, it does not necessarily create the appearance
of unfairness. Assuming that the trier is impartial, both parties are at least playing with the same
dice. A second distinction relates to the nature of a de novo proceeding. It seems unrealistic to assume
that a trier in a de novo proceeding can totally ignore the fact that the issue has already been adjudi-
cated to a specific result. When the flaw with the first trier is his lack of legal education, the second
trier will know this and take account of it in the way he regards the nonlawyer's findings. In the case
of a biased initial adjudicator, however, the trier de novo will not necessarily discount the value of the
initial adjudication, because he might be unaware of the bias or fail to attribute sufficient significance
to it.
170. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRIsIS AND REFORM 148-49 (1985).
171. It should be emphasized that the due process issue of adjudicatory independence arises in the
ALJ context only to the extent that a liberty or property interest is implicated. The issue of ALJ
independence reaches a constitutional level largely because of the Supreme Court's recent expansion of
those concepts to encompass statutorily created rights.
172. 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
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where the judge and one of the litigants or attorneys are embroiled in a
heated personal dispute.173
This distinction in constitutional treatment between personal bias and
financial interest cannot be justified by a difference in the degree of temp-
tation involved. A judge is likely to be far more concerned with giving his
brother-in-law a break than with securing $5.00 for a traffic conviction.
Similarly, the temptation to get revenge against a party that the judge
dislikes may be as alluring as pecuniary gain.
There are some differences, however, in our capacity to rectify these
different biases. When a strong relationship exists between judge and liti-
gant, it is almost always possible to find a more disinterested judge. But,
to some extent, personal feelings are unavoidable. For example, judges
might be a bit more prone to accept the arguments of attorneys who ap-
pear before them on a frequent basis, or who occupy some official govern-
mental post such as district attorney or solicitor general. There seems no
way to avoid this potential for bias. To the extent that the category of
personal biases includes such inevitable feelings, the Court is correct in
rejecting any constitutional interest. But to the extent that the category
also includes more specific and identifiable, and therefore more avoidable,
predispositions, courts should respond as in the case of a judge with a
direct financial interest in the outcome of the case.
Issues of this sort often arise in the context of the summary contempt
power. 174 The Court has recognized that a judge who is embroiled in a
personal dispute with a litigant or attorney may be very tempted to be
influenced by his own anger. But the Court has found this potential for
bias a necessary evil in all but the most exceptional cases. According to the
Court, "such power, although arbitrary in its nature and liable to abuse,
is absolutely essential to the protection of the courts in the discharge of
their functions. Without it, judicial tribunals would be at the mercy of the
disorderly and violent. .. ."" The Court seems to assume that a judge
must possess authority to enforce her contempt power in order to preserve
a semblance of order.
But how is the judicial process protected by having the same judge who
is subjected to the contemptible behavior mete out the punishment for it?
173. See generally Sedler, The Summary Contempt Power and the Constitution: The View From
Without and Within, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34 (1976).
174. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11
(1954). For a thorough discussion and critique of the Court's treatment of the summary contempt
power, see Sedler, supra note 173.
175. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888). The Terry Court relied in part on the fact that
such power was "settled doctrine in the jurisprudence both of England and of this country. . . ." Id.
The Court has since continued to rely on the long tradition of that power. But reliance on history is
not a proper substitute for functional analysis of the current necessity of the doctrine. See supra notes
62-69 and accompanying text (discussing Court's repudiation of historical approach).
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There is no reason why the judge could not swear out a complaint that
would be heard before another judge on an expedited basis. The only
possible advantage to allowing the same judge to hear the case is the
heightened fear that this arrangement creates among litigants and attor-
neys who contemplate resisting the court's commands. But because this
extra fear reflects the anticipated bias, it can hardly constitute a legitimate
reason for maintaining the current system.
3. Predisposition to Facts or Law
The Supreme Court has never held that prior exposure to facts or prior
adherence to a legal position violates due process. As with the other cate-
gories, the rule of necessity has played its part in the creation of doctrine
concerning this category of bias. There can certainly be no bias more per-
vasive than a predisposition to the exact issues-factual or legal-before
the courtY7 To the extent that such predisposition arises out of a judge's
general knowledge in the area of law, it is impossible, and certainly unde-
sirable, to eliminate it. But this category also includes predispositions that
arise out of a decisonmaker's prior involvement in a case. In this latter
situation, the potential for bias is relatively easy to eliminate, and there-
fore should not be tolerated.
It is simply impossible to eliminate all predisposition to legal issues. As
Justice Rehnquist pointed out in Laird v. Tatum, "[p]roof that a Justice's
mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the
area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualifica-
tion, not lack of bias. ' 17 7 In Laird, the Justice refused to disqualify him-
self from participating in a decision which turned on a legal issue that he
had publicly spoken about before his appointment to the Court. This deci-
sion seems reasonable, because once it is assumed that it is impossible to
eradicate predispositions, the fact that the Justice was outspoken on the
issue should make no difference.
The bias that comes from the judge's intellectual or political position,
however, differs from the type of bias that occurs when an individual ad-
judicates an issue with which she has had prior involvement, either in the
position of an advocate or as a judge in an earlier stage of the case. The
judge then has a strong motivation to hold that her initial decision was the
176. In the case of pecuniary interest, the decider might or might not allow the irrelevant factor to
enter his mind. The fact that it is so clearly irrelevant is to some extent helpful since the decider has
no doubt that it is impermissible for him to consider it. Yet predispositions that result from prior
prosecutorial experience in the case at hand are also irrelevant. The judge should base his decision
exclusively on that information brought out during the course of the adjudication. The fact that the
previously gained impressions are close to the issues being adjudicated makes it inevitable that they
will enter the decisionmaker's mind.
177. 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972).
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correct one, and to a certain extent she acts as judge in her own case. This
problem often presents itself in administrative decisionmaking when the
adjudicator was previously responsible for initiating the prosecution. Not-
withstanding the ease with which this problem could be eradicated by im-
plementing a clear separation-of-functions requirement, the Court has
been quite tolerant of the administrative agencies in this context. In FTC
v. Cement Institute, for example, the Court refused to disqualify the
Commission from adjudicating the case, even though the Court assumed
that a prejudgment of the issues "had been formed by the entire member-
ship of the Commission as a result of its prior official investigations."17
The Court did not justify its decision with the argument that the risk of
bias is minimal under the circumstances. Rather, the Court pointed out
that if the Commission were disqualified, no government agency would be
able to act on a complaint without disqualifying itself from adjudicating
the case.
179
The Court, once again, exaggerated the necessity of its decision. The
question should not have been whether, under the current scheme of ad-
ministrative process, disqualification would affect all adjudicatory authori-
ties. Rather, the question should have been whether some scheme might
be devised in which the threat of bias could be eliminated. Because there
is no compelling reason that makes strict separation of functions impossi-
ble, the Court simply could have held that the due process clause dictates
separation of the prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in the agency
context.180
178. 333 U.S. 683, 700 (1948).
179. Id. at 701. One could certainly explain the Court's opinions in this area as relying on the
ground of necessity-in many cases misperceived. As for the existence of the potential for bias, the
Court has at times required institutional changes to cope with the problem. In Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), the Court ordered the separation of functions in the context of depor-
tation proceedings. In so doing, the Court seemed to accept the position of a number of commissions
that had dealt with the issue. As for the level of bias, the Court quoted a report which concluded that
"[a] genuinely impartial hearing, conducted with critical detachment, is psychologically improbable if
not impossible, when the presiding officer has at once the responsibility of appraising the strength of
the case and of seeking to make it as strong as possible." Id. at 44 (quoting Secretary of Labor's
Comm. on Admin. Proc., The Immigration and Naturalization Service 81-82 (mimeo. 1940)). As for
the necessity, the Court cited another committee that had concluded that "[t]hese types of commingling
of functions . . . are . . . plainly undesirable. But they are also avoidable and should be avoided by
appropriate internal division of labor." 339 U.S. at 44, (quoting Ra'. ArTY. GEN. COMM. AD.
PROC., S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1941)).
180. In order to make the right to a non-biased adjudicator meaningful, parties should be afforded
an opportunity to present their case for disqualification before some judge other than the one charged
with potential bias. The federal recusal statute does not make any such provision and is in this sense
severely deficient. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1983) (instructing individual judge to disqualify himself
under certain circumstances). Although the ABA standards do go a bit further, they do not, in our
opinion, go far enough. See ABA STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 2-32. The Standards
recommend that factual issues raised by the motion should be heard and resolved by another judge.
The focus on factual issues ignores the reality that legal issues about disqualification may be the
dispositive issues in many contexts.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The balancing scheme that the Supreme Court has adopted to deal with
the competing interests of individuals and government under the due pro-
cess clauses runs counter to the purpose and function of those clauses. As
integral aspects of the Bill of Rights, the due process clauses were devised
as protections of individual rights, and must not be subordinated to gov-
ernment interests that are short of overwhelming. Courts should not use
the flexibility inherent in the clauses as a means of reading them out of
the Constitution.
We have been unable to envision even one situation in which the values
of due process can be achieved without the participation of an independent
adjudicator. Moreover, in defining the term "independence," even the
slightest hint of bias or undue influence must, as a general matter, dis-
qualify a particular decisionmaker 81 Only when it is all but impossible
to rectify bias should a potential lack of independence be tolerated. Once
such an adjudicator is given power to implement procedures that she finds
necessary, the Court can rest a bit more assured that the values of proce-
dural due process will be protected.
In applying our model we have found that the right to an independent
adjudicator-and hence the promise of due process itself-continues to go
unfulfilled in a great many contexts. Specifically, we argue that due pro-
cess is inadequately protected when an individual must depend on an ad-
judicator who lacks salary and tenure protection (such as most state court
judges and all ALJs) to protect an entitlement to a life, liberty, or prop-
erty interest. Similarly, we challenge the practice of allowing an adjudica-
To force a litigant to argue the legal issues before the very judge in question is especially problem-
atic in view of some courts' holdings that a judge's refusal to disqualify himself is not a final order
and may not be appealed interlocutorily. See Liddell v. Board of Educ., 677 F.2d 626, 643 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 877 (1982); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 614 F.2d 958
(5th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Washington, 573 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978). Although a writ of mandamus is
usually available, that writ places exceedingly heavy burdens on the party seeking it. See Keer v. U.S.
Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976) (party seeking writ must prove "dear and indisputable" right to
it). Moreover, some courts of appeals have been reluctant to exercise the mandamus power and have
forced litigants to raise disqualification issues at the end of the entire proceeding. See, e.g., In re
Corrugated Antitrust Litigation, 614 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1980); City of Cleveland v. Krupansky, 619
F.2d 576 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980). These courts' assumption that going through a
trial presided over by a biased judge is not a sufficiently severe harm to merit extraordinary relief
seems at odds with the Supreme Court's pronouncement that due process affords a right to an impar-
tial adjudicator at all stages of judicial proceedings. See supra note 169.
For a disqualification procedure more consistent with the spirit of true judicial independence, see
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170(e) (West 1982) ("No judge, against whom a statement of objection or
disqualification has been filed. . . shall hear or pass upon any question of fact or law concerning his
disqualification.") (emphasis added). The California approach is also noteworthy in that it provides
for automatic disqualification of a judge if a party files a motion and affidavit asserting that the judge
is prejudiced. Id. § 170.6. A party is given only one such opportunity in the course of a proceeding,
and after expending that opportunity he must resort to the normal disqualification procedure. Id.
181. Of course, this rule applies only when a liberty or property interest has been found present.
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tor who has been the subject of allegedly contemptuous behavior to serve
as prosecutor, judge, and jury through the summary contempt power.
These contexts are, of course, only exemplary, and we suspect that further
application of our model will reveal that amidst all of the debate about
what interests trigger due process, courts and commentators have ignored
the fact that without prophylactic protection of adjudicatory independence,
the Constitution's majestic guarantee of due process of law may in reality
be no more than a deceptive facade.
